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1. INTRODUCTION
Frequently overshadowed by the more scintillating equity
markets, the corporate debt markets are currently the focus of
closer regulatory scrutiny - a result of the recent corporate
meltdowns and the concurrent, albeit unrelated, integration of the
European financial markets. Debt issuances are a longstanding
staple in the arsenal of financing tools used by corporate issuers.
In the United States alone, total underwritings of corporate debt
totaled $2.66 trillion in 2004 compared to $202.7 billion in
underwritten equity deals.' Notwithstanding the large volume of
corporate debt deals, because so many of them are effected in the
over-the-counter ("OTC") market or through off-exchange
transactions2 with sophisticated institutional investors, debt
offerings often have not garnered the regulatory attention often
paid to equity deals.
One of the byproducts of the recent financial frauds has been
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1 SEC. INDus. AS'N, 2005 SECURITIES INDUSTRY ASSOCIATION FACT BOOK 4
(2005).
2 In this article, the term "OTC transaction" refers to the trading of unlisted
corporate bonds. The term "off-exchange transactions" refers to bonds listed on
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an enhanced appreciation by regulators on a global basis of the
importance of debt offerings as a source of financing. A quick
survey of some of the financial frauds that have occurred in the
past few years-Enron, WorldCom, Parmalat, Adelphia -reveals
how corporate debt securities loomed large as instruments for the
losses suffered by investors. For example, the year before it
collapsed, WorldCom, Inc. raised at least $12 billion in a public
debt offering.3 Parmalat Finanziaria SpA ("Parmalat"), which had
debt securities listed on the Milan and Luxembourg securities
exchanges, had approximately $9.4 billion in bonds outstanding at
the time insolvency proceedings were instituted, a substantial
portion of which were held by retail4 and non-Italian investors.
5
Debt holders were left holding billions of dollars in losses as a
result of these frauds, most of which involved accounting
irregularities 6 and, in many cases, questionable related-party
3 Gretchen Morgenson, Judge in WorldCom Action Sides with Plaintiffs on Issue
of Due Diligence by Banks, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 16, 2004, at C4.
4 Throughout this Article, "retail investors" refers to investors who purchase
and sell securities on their own behalf, and not on behalf of an organization.
5 By the time that Parmalat's insolvency proceedings were instituted, it had
approximately $18 billion in debt, of which $6.2 billion was held by non-Italian
bondholders and bank lenders. See Soma Biswas, Parmalat's Foreign Creditors
Upset, DAILY DEAL, Mar. 17, 2004, available at LEXIS, News Library (describing
foreign bondholder dissatisfaction with insolvency proceedings); Paul Betts,
Parmalat Sting Hits Italian Pensioners, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2005, at 22 (noting that
many individual investors in Parmalat bonds or shares are over 60 years old).
6 The U.S. Securities Exchange Commission ("SEC") charged Enron Corp. of
defrauding investors by manipulating its publicly reported financial results, such
as through the improper use of special purpose entities. See Press Release, U.S.
Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Jeffrey K. Skilling, Enron's Former President,
Chief Executive Officer and Chief Operating Officer, with Fraud (Feb. 19, 2004)
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-18.htm [hereinafter SEC Charges Jeffrey
K. Skilling with Fraud] (itemizing SEC allegations of improper activity against
Enron Corp.). Parmalat admitted in a December 19, 2003 press release that it had
overstated its assets by at least $4.9 billion in its 2002 audited financial statements.
Stephen Taub, Were Banks "Reckless" with Parmalat?, CFO.CoM, Jan. 6, 2004,
available at LEXIS News Library. The SEC also charged WorldCom, Inc. with
overstating its income as a result of undisclosed and improper accounting
practices. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, The Honorable Jed Rakoff
Approves Settlement of SEC's Claim for a Civil Penalty Against WorldCom (July
7, 2003), http://www.sec.gov/ news/press/2003-81.htm (alleging improper
accounting practices). Some have estimated that the Worldcom accounting fraud
amounted to an overstatement of approximately $3.9 billion. See E. Scott Reckard,
The WorldCom Scandal, L.A. TIMES, June 27, 2002, at C7 (reporting that WorldCom
improperly booked routine expenses as capital improvements). The SEC also
alleged that Adelphia fraudulently excluded billions of dollars in liabilities from
its consolidated financial statements by hiding them in off-balance sheet affiliates,
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transactions that enabled companies to hide their losses through
the use of related companies and special purpose entities.
7
These recent corporate debacles have highlighted the need for
full and fair disclosure to investors when issuers raise capital in the
markets through debt offerings and listings, particularly when
retail investors are involved. The International Organization of
Securities Commissions ("IOSCO"), which consists of 183 securities
regulatory agencies from around the world,8 published a report
dated February 2005 that highlighted the need for greater
regulatory focus on a global basis in improving such disclosures.9
The IOSCO Report noted in particular the increasing involvement
of retail investors in the market for corporate debt securities.10
Retail investment in the corporate bond market most likely will
and falsified operating statistics and inflated earnings in order to meet Wall Street
expectations. See Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC and U.S. Attorney
Settle Massive Financial Fraud Case Against Adelphia and Rigas Family for $715
Million (Apr. 25, 2005), http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-63.htm (alleging
that Adelphia excluded liabilities, falsified statistics and earnings, and hid self-
dealing) [hereinafter SEC and U.S. Attorney Settle Fraud Case Against Adelphia].
7 See, e.g., Law Differs for Italian and US Parmalat Shareholders, INS. DAY, Apr.
14, 2004 (noting that Parmalat used roughly 250 related entities to inflate
earnings); Stephen Taub, supra note 6 (detailing Parmalat's alleged stategy of
creating holding companies with fake assets); SEC Charges Jeffrey K. Skilling with
Fraud, supra note 6 (alleging the use of special purpose entities to manipulate
financial results). Other related-party transactions included, among other things,
loans to insiders, such as Adelphia Communications' loans to the Rigas family
that controlled it, and WorldCom's alleged $400 million loan to its Chief Executive
Officer. See Jill Goldsmith, Tell-All Findings on Adelphia Unfold, DAILY VARIETY,
May 28, 2002, at 7 (noting that Adelphia gave private loans to family members to
fund a variety of ventures); Pradnya Joshi, 'Telecom Cowboy' Goes on Trial,
NEWSDAY, Jan. 18, 2005, at A35; SEC and U.S. Attorney Settle Fraud Case Against
Adelphia, supra note 6 (noting that Adelphia engaged in self-dealing, which
included the use of Adelphia funds to finance the Rigas family's business
undertakings).
8 See IOSCO Membership and Committee Lists, at
http://www.iosco.org/lists/ (follow "Ordinary," "Associate," and "Affiliate"
hyperlinks) (listing member countries) (last visited on Oct. 23, 2005).
9 IOSCO TECHNICAL COMM., REPORT ON STRENGTHENING CAPITAL MARKETS
AGAINST FINANCIAL FRAUD 19-20 (2005), available at http://www.iosco.
org/library/pubdocs/ pdf/IOSCOPD192.pdf [hereinafter IOSCO FINANCIAL
FRAUDS REPORT]. In an earlier project, IOSCO published a report highlighting the
need for more transparency in the pricing of the corporate bond markets. IOSCO
TECHNICAL COMM., REPORT ON TRANSPARENCY OF CORPORATE BOND MARKETS 24
(2004),. available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD168
.pdf [hereinafter IOSCO BOND TRANSPARENCY REPORT].
10 IOSCO FINANCIAL FRAUDS REPORT, supra note 9, at 19 (citing IOSCO BOND
TRANSPARENCY REPORT).
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increase as a result of the aging of the population in the developed
markets. As individual investors get closer to retirement age, more
of them are expected to shift their investments from equity
securities to the comparatively more secure bonds.11 In October
2005, IOSCO further underscored the importance of high quality
corporate debt disclosures by publishing for public comment
proposed IOSCO International Disclosure Principles for Cross-Border
Offerings and Listings of Debt Securities by Foreign Issuers.12 These
Principles set forth substantive disclosure guidance for
prospectuses and other documents used in the public offering and
listings of "plain vanilla" corporate debt securities and, once a final
version of the Principles is endorsed by IOSCO, are expected to be
used by securities regulators who are developing or reviewing
their disclosure regimes for cross-border offerings and listings of
debt securities.
13
In addition, the tectonic shift in the regulation of the financial
markets in the European Union ("EU"), precipitated by the EU
Financial Services Action Plan ("FSAP")14 in 1999, has forced EU
regulators into a delicate balancing act. The FSAP establishes an
ambitious legislative program aimed at integrating the financial
markets of all 25 EU Member States into a single capital market.15
11 See IOSCO BOND TRANSPARENCY REPORT, supra note 9, at 5 (documenting
recent bond market growth); Alexander Schaub, Dir. Gen., DG Int'l Mkt. and
Serv., Speech at the European Savings Bank Group Conference: The Financial
Services Action Plan: Evaluation and Future (Dec. 8, 2004),
http://europa.eu.int/comm/intemal-market/speeches/2004/2004-12-08-schaub
en.htm (discussing that the current single market framework for retail
investments is in need of improvement).
12 IOSCO TECHNICAL COMM., CONSULTATION REPORT: INTERNATIONAL
DISCLOSURE PRINCIPLES FOR CROSS-BORDER OFFERINGS AND LISTINGS OF DEBT
SECURITIES BY FOREIGN ISSUERS (Oct. 2005), available at http://
www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD202.pdf.
13 Id. at 1.
14 EUROPEAN COMM'N, FINANCIAL SERVICES: ACTION PLAN IMPLEMENTING THE
FRAMEWORK FOR FINANCIAL MARKETS: ACTION PLAN, COM (1999) 232 (May 11,
1999). At its special meeting in Lisbon in March 2000, the European Council set
2005 as the due date for implementation of the Financial Services Action Plan
("FSAP"). See Press Release, Council of Ministers, Presidency Conclusions: Lisbon
European Council 23 and 24 March 2000 (Mar. 28, 2000) http://europa.
eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=PRES/00/900&format=HTML&
aged=l&language=EN&guiLanguage=en (advocating implementation of the
FSAP).
15 See EUROPEAN COMM'N, FINANCIAL SERVICES: THE FSAP ENTERS THE HOME
STRAIGHT, NINTH REPORT 2 (2003), http://europa.eu.int/comm/
internal-market/finances/docs/actionplan/index/progress9_en.pdf (describing
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This integration is being effectuated through a series of Directives
(such as the Market Abuse Directive, 16 the Prospectus Directive,'
7
and the Transparency Directive18), which EU Member States must
implement into national legislation by certain dates; and
Regulations (such as the International Accounting Standards
Regulation19), which become effective without further action by EU
Member States. While expected to improve the regulatory and
supervisory framework of the European financial markets, these
legislative acts will also subject issuers in many of those markets to
more stringent disclosure standards. In implementing the FSAP,
EU regulators have to consider the best strategy for protecting
investors and facilitating the smooth functioning of their newly
integrated markets, while at the same time safeguarding these
markets from competition by other, less regulated, markets in non-
EU member jurisdictions. Inroads into the lucrative Eurobond
market,20  which is based predominantly in London and
Luxembourg, are already being made by several non-EU securities
the progress of FSAP implementation).
16 Council Directive 2003/6, on Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation,
2003 O.J. (L 96) 16 (E.C) [hereinafter Market Abuse Directive].
17 Council Directive 2003/71 on the Prospectus to Be Published When
Securities Are Offered to the Public or Admitted to Trading and Amending
Directive 2001/34/EC 2003/71, 2003 O.J. (L 345) 64 (EC) [hereinafter Prospectus
Directive]. The specific disclosure requirements that would apply are established
in the Commission Regulation 809/2004 Implementing Directive 2003/71/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council as Regards Information Contained in
Prospectuses as well as the Format, Incorporation by Reference and Publication of
Such Prospectuses and Dissemination of Advertisements, 2004 O.J. (L 149) 1
[hereinafter Prospectus Implementing Regulation].
18 Council Directive 2004/109 on the Harmonisation of Transparency
Requirements in Relation to Information About Issuers Whose Securities Are
Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market and Amending Directive
2001/34/EC, 2004 O.J. (L 390/38) (EC) [hereinafter Transparency Directive].
19 Council Regulation 1606/2002 on the Application of International
Accounting Standards, 2002 O.J. (L 243) 1 [hereinafter International Accounting
Standards Regulation].
20 Eurobonds are bonds that are issued multinationally and denominated in a
currency other than the currency used in the country in which the bonds are
issued. For example, this would include U.S. dollar-denominated bonds sold by a
U.S. issuer to Dutch investors. See generally SEC, REPORT OF THE STAFF OF THE U.S.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION TO THE SENATE COMMITTEE ON BANKING,
HOUSING AND URBAN AFFAIRS AND THE HOUSE COMMFITEE ON ENERGY AND
COMMERCE ON THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF THE SECURITIES MARKETS, at G-3, 11-35
to II-51 (outlining the development of the Eurobond market); Alex Skorecki,
Eurobonds LSE Plans a Fresh Way of Listing, FIN. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2005, at 41
(describing risky methods for exchanging Eurobonds.).
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exchanges. 21
The new regime for the regulation of the public debt markets in
the EU presents an interesting case study of the challenges faced by
regulators in implementing the FSAP. Currently in the developed
markets, the approach taken to regulating the disclosures by
corporate issuers of public debt securities differs among securities
regulators, depending to a great extent on their perception of the
relative risks faced by investors in corporate bonds. In some
jurisdictions, corporate issuers are not required to disclose as much
information about the issuer's operations and prospects when they
list and publicly offer bonds compared to what is required of them
when offering presumptively riskier securities, such as shares. The
reason for this disparity is that debt investors' interests in the
issuer are presumably more limited than the interest of equity
holders. Under the new EU Prospectus Directive, corporate issuers
that make public offerings or have their securities admitted to
trading on "regulated markets" 22 in the European Union are
required to provide prospectus disclosures under a "building
blocks" approach.23  This means that different prospectus
disclosure requirements apply to each category of security that is
offered or listed, reflecting securities regulators' assessments of the
level of information that investors would find relevant to their
investment decisions. In addition, the prospectus requirements
21 See Michael Evans, Swiss Make Play for Eurobond Market: Disclosure Rules
Are Forcing Issuers to Consider Listing Outside the EU, INT'L FIN. L. REV., December
2004, at 15 (describing how Singapore's recent success in luring to its markets
Asian issuers that otherwise would have listed in Europe has encouraged efforts
by the SWX Swiss Exchange to attract Eurobond listings); Mark Kalderon &
Alexandra Hope, How the Prospectus Directive Will Affect Issuers, INT'L FIN. L. REV.,
BANKING YEARBOOK 2004, at 12 (claiming the FSAP will affect all security
exchanges within the EU); Edward Roby, European Regulators Pile Pressure on Bond
Markets, EFINANCIALNEWS.COM (April 17, 2005), available at LEXIS, News Library
(explaining that the SWX Swiss Exchange's Eurobond market will not be subject
to the EU Directives).
22 The applicability of the EU Directives depends on whether the securities
will be publicly offered or admitted to trading on an EU regulated market.
"Regulated market" is defined in the EU Investment Services Directive. Council
Directive 2004/39 on Markets in Financial Instruments Amending Council
Directives 85/611/EEC and 93/6/EEC and Directive 2000/12/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council and Repealing Council Directive
93/22/EEC, art. 4(1)(14), 2004 O.J. (L 145) 1, 10 (EC). The term "regulated
market" includes the major stock exchanges in Europe, such as the London Stock
Exchange and the Luxembourg Stock Exchange.
23 See Prospectus Implementing Regulation, supra note 17, art. 21 at 12
(describing mandatory minimum disclosure requirements).
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differentiate between bonds that are most likely to be purchased by
retail, as opposed to sophisticated institutional, investors.
In other jurisdictions such as in the United States, however,
these distinctions between investments in equity securities and
debt securities are not observed in the prospectus disclosure
requirements. Debt securities that are registered for a public
offering may be freely traded in the public markets, so there is a
presumption that retail investors in those securities may resell
them in the secondary markets. Because retail investors in
registered debt are not expected to hold corporate bonds to
maturity, investors in these securities are viewed as needing the
same level of information as investors in shares.
Because the EU and the United States follow two diametrically
opposed paradigms in regulating prospectus requirements for debt
offerings and listings to retail investors, this article compares and
contrasts both debt disclosure regimes to determine the salient
factors that influence the regulatory approaches taken by securities
regulators in these jurisdictions. Part I of the article describes the
characteristics of the corporate bond market in each jurisdiction.
Part II of the article describes the prospectus disclosure regime for
debt securities that is being implemented in the EU and the regime
currently in place in the United States. Part III considers the role
that the legal framework plays in encouraging the development of
a particular type of regulatory regime. Jurisdictions in which
issuers may be subject to substantial litigation risk may provide
regulators with a strong incentive to establish more detailed
disclosure rules, as opposed to a so-called "principles-based"
system. Part IV considers the way that all of these influences play
out in the approach taken in the EU and the United States for
specific disclosure items that arguably should be provided in the
non-financial statement portion of debt prospectuses, such as
Management's Discussion and Analysis ("MD&A") and related-
party transactions. Finally, this article considers how the
internationalization of the markets may influence the further
evolution of these disclosure regimes.
2. OVERVIEW OF THE CORPORATE BOND MARKETS IN THE UNITED
STATES AND EUROPE
Although many companies involved in the recent financial
frauds had substantial issuances of public debt, historically,
offerings of debt securities as a financing mechanism have been
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
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used more commonly by U.S. companies. In Europe, bank lending
traditionally has predominated as a source of capital,24 but more
European issuers have been tapping the bond markets since the
creation of the euro in 1999.25
In the United States, most of the corporate bond issuances are
of investment grade debt. In 2004, approximately eighty-five
percent of the corporate bond issuances in terms of dollar volume
were in investment grade debt, and the remaining corporate bond
issuances were in high-yield debt (i.e., junk bonds).26 The vast
majority of investment grade corporate bonds are registered for
sale in the public markets.27 Secondary market trading in the
corporate debt market occurs primarily among institutions28 in the
over-the-counter market.
29
In contrast, most of the high-yield corporate bonds trade in the
Rule 144A 30 market. 31 Under Rule 144A of the Securities Act of
24 See Valentine V. Craig, The Changing Corporate Governance Environment:
Implications for the Banking Industry, 16 FDIC BANKING REV. 121 (2004) (identifying
the main developments of the changing banking environment and issues of
corporate governance that U.S. bankers are likely to face); Italian Need for Corporate
Governance Reform Increases in Wake of Parmalat, INS. DAY, Apr. 15, 2004 (noting that
large family owned and controlled companies in Italy traditionally have enjoyed
close relationships with banks, which made it easier to obtain low interest bank
loans); Brian Quinton, Continental Shifts, CORP. LEGAL TIMES, Aug. 2004, at 54
(identifying the main developments of the changing corporate governance
environment).
25 See Charles Batchelor, A Way Into Complex Bond Markets, FIN. TIMES, May 7,
2005, at M23 (noting ways to enter into the bond markets).
26 The Bond Market Association, Corporate Issuance: High Yield & Investment
Grade-Monthly (chart), http://www.bondmarkets.com/story.asp?id=97 (last
visited Oct. 22, 2005).
27 See George W. Fenn, Speed of Issuance and the Adequacy of Disclosure in the
144A High-Yield Debt Market, 56 J. FIN. ECON. 383, 387 (2000) (attributing the heavy
reliance on Rule 144A by many issuers of high-yield debt to their inability to meet
the requirements for shelf registration); Miles Livingston & Lei Zhou, The Impact of
Rule 144A Debt Offerings Upon Bond Yields and Underwriter Fees, FIN. MGMT. 5, 12
(2002) (estimating that over 80% of investment-grade bonds are offered in the
public debt market). By registering debt securities for sale in the public markets,
issuers may be able to avoid paying premium yields to compensate for the
reduced liquidity of Rule 144A issuances. See Livingston & Zhou, supra.
28 See Press Release, Bond Market Association, The Bond Market Association
Resolves to Work with SEC, NASD in Developing Systems to Improve Corporate
Bond Transparency (Sept. 28, 1998), http://www.bondmarkets .com/pr/1998pr/
pricetestimony.shtml (discussing the problem of price transparency in the
corporate bond market stemming from its largely institutional character).
29 See IOSCO BOND TRANSPARENCY REPORT, supra note 9, at 24 (discussing
transparency for corporate bonds in the over-the-counter market).
30 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (2005).
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1933 ("Securities Act"),32 securities that have been privately placed
or sold in an offering that is otherwise exempt from registration
(such as under Regulation S 33 ) may be resold to certain large
institutional investors without registration. This means that resales
of these restricted securities to institutions that satisfy the Rule's
definition of a "Qualified Institutional Buyer" ("QIB") 34 need not
be accompanied by a prospectus and are not subject to the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission's ("SEC") disclosure
requirements. A substantial number of Rule 144A transactions are
underwritten, however, which has resulted in the use of an
offering memorandum and substantive disclosures that are similar
to the information that is provided in a prospectus for a public
offering.35 In addition, bonds sold in U.S. private placements
frequently contain financial covenants that provide debt holders
with important protections which are less commonly seen with
Eurobonds.36
As in the United States, the bond market in Europe is
dominated by institutional investors. 37 In Europe, most corporate
31 See Fenn, supra note 27, at 384 (noting that more than 80% of high-yield
debt securities were issued in the Rule 144A market in 1997, with market analysts
predicting that this figure would likely increase over time); Livingston & Zhou,
supra note 27, at 5 ("Rule 144A issues have accounted for up to 80% of the high-
yield bondmarket in recent years.").
32 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77mm (2000).
33 17 C.F.R. §§ 230.901-905 (2005) (providing a safe harbor from registration
under the Securities Act of 1933 "Securities Act" for offers and sales of securities
made outside of the United States).
34 A "Qualified Institutional Buyer" ("QIB") is defined in Rule 144A(a)(1) as
an institution that in the aggregate owns and invests on a discretionary basis,
either for its own account or the accounts of other QIBs, at least $100 million in
securities of issuers that are not affiliated with it. 17 C.F.R. § 144A(a)(1).
35 See Felicia H. Kung, The Rationalization of Regulatory Internationalization, 33
LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 443, 453 & n.49 (describing how the demand by
institutional investors for underwritten Rule 144A deals has helped to expand the
Rule 144A market); Fenn, supra note 27 (ascribing the prospectus-like
documentation to demands by underwriters of Rule 144A offerings).
36 See Colleen Marie O'Connor, The Private Route, INVESTMENT DEALERS DIG.,
Aug. 16, 2004, at 30, 33 (noting that the majority of private placements in the
United States, including those executed by an increasing number of German
companies, are executed with covenants designed to protect bondholders); Experts
Stumped on Stunted European Market Development, PRIVATE PLACEMENT LETTER, Oct.
27, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library (studying the rise of a European private
placement market in the shadow of the huge Eurobond market).
37 See THE BOND MKT. ASS'N, EUROPEAN BOND PRICING SOURCES AND SERVICES:
IMPLICATIONS FOR PRICE TRANSPARENCY IN THE EUROPEAN BOND MARKET 7 (2005)
available at http://www.bondmarkets.com/assets/files/PriceTransparencyStudy
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bonds are listed on an exchange, but a large amount of the trading
in these bonds actually occurs off the exchange. 38 Exchange
listings are sought as a means of obtaining favorable tax treatment
for the issuer, and to satisfy the investment restrictions of some
institutional investors and fund managers.
39
Although the institutional market is the most significant one
for corporate bonds, the retail market is becoming increasingly
important. In both Europe and the United States, most of the
trading volume in bonds occurs in the institutional market, but the
highest number of bond transactions occurs in the retail market.
40
In Italy, Switzerland, Germany, Belgium, the Netherlands, and
Luxembourg, an active retail debt market exists, albeit on a much
smaller scale than the institutional one.
41
The growing significance of the retail bond market can be
attributed to several factors. In the past few years, the equity
markets have performed relatively poorly, as evidenced by the
equity sell-offs during 2000 through 2003.42 Investors appear to be
-april05.pdf (describing the role of the institutional investor in European and
American markets).
38 IOSCO BOND TRANSPARENCY REPORT, supra note 9, at 6.
39 See Michael1 Evans, supra note 21, at 16 ("[M]any investors are bound by
their'investment rules to trade mainly in securities listed on a regulated market");
IOSCO BOND TRANSPARENCY REPORT, supra note 9, at 6-7 (stating that the number
of exchanged listed issues is declining in some countries despite overall growth in
trading activity).
40 See THE BOND MKT. ASS'N, supra note 37, at 2 (noting that this phenomenon
is seen in both the European and U.S. bond markets); IOSCO BOND TRANSPARENCY
REPORT, supra note 9, at 4 (approximating that 65% of the trades in corporate
bonds in the United States occurs in the retail market (defined by the National
Association of Securities Dealers as transactions valued at less than $100,000),
although these trades represent less than 2% of the total trading value).
41 THE BOND MKT. Ass'N, supra note 37, at 7; see also Charles Batchelor, Retail
Therapy for Bond Issuers, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 19, 2004, at 41 (noting that smaller
investors have become an important factor in bond market strategies of issuers in
Italy, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom); Charles Batchelor, Wallflowers of the
Markets Get A Chance to Dance, FIN. TIMES, May 11, 2004, at 24 [hereinafter
Batchelor, Wallflowers of the Markets] (explaining how emerging market bonds are
coming to life in European capital markets).
42 See generally Natasha de Teran, Hurdles for the Next Big Idea in Retail,
BANKER, Jan. 2005, at 48 (noting that the poor performance of the equity market is
steering retail investors into other investments); Batchelor, Wallflowers of the
Markets, supra note 41, at 24 ("The collapse of equity markets during the period
2000-2003 has made it unattractive for many companies to issue shares."); IOSCO
BOND TRANSPARENCY REPORT, supra note 9, at 4 (claiming that a by-product of the
2000-2001 lull in equity markets has been increased retail participation in the
corporate bond market reflecting a greater investor interest in spreading risks).
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searching for investments that provide relatively high income, but
at a low capital risk.43 Banks have also been eager to reduce their
exposure to non-performing loans, so the reliance by European
issuers on bank lending has been eroding slowly. 44 Indeed, this
decreased reliance on bank lending is viewed as evidence of the
successful efforts in the EU to develop an integrated European
capital market.45 In addition, a series of pension fund scandals in
Europe have highlighted the risks of investing too heavily in
equity securities. 46 All of these factors have led to increased retail
investor interest in the bond markets, which concomitantly has
stimulated issuers' interest in the retail bond market as an
attractive source of financing.
47
In the United States, sales of new corporate bonds to retail
investors have doubled to $25 billion annually since 2001.48 The
transparency of corporate bond pricing has also been improving in
the past few years, with vast improvements seen on the retail side.
This greater price transparency should enhance the liquidity of
secondary market trading in the retail market.49 Price information
about sales of U.S. dollar-denominated, book-entry eligible
securities that are issued by U.S. or foreign private issuers,
50
43 Jane J. Kim, Growing Investor Demand Spurs More Choices for Buying Bonds,
WALL ST. J., May 24, 2005, at D2.
44 Batchelor, Wallflowers of the Markets, supra note 41, at 24; see O'Connor,
supra note 36, at 32 (concluding that the weakness of the German banking sector
has encouraged German corporations to look to more diversification of funding
sources).
45 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 15, at 1.
46 Batchelor, Wallflowers of the Markets, supra note 41, at 24. See also Ben Hall,
Challenge Remains to Revive Occupational Savings System, FIN. TIMES, May 15-16,
2004, at 3 (arguing that British government initiatives have done little to rebuild
investors' confidence in pension fund investment in light of recent pension
scandals); Rachel Stevenson, Move to Protect Workers from Pension Fund Scandals,
THE INDEP. (London), June 12, 2003, at 2 (analyzing the scheme put forth by the
British government to help protect pensions when a firm goes bankrupt).
47 See Kim, supra note 43 (noting that companies are offering products and
services to stimulate retail investment in bonds). See also Schaub, infra note 56
(describing marketing efforts to attract a wider investor base).
48 See Marie Leone, Capital Ideas: Big Issuers, Small Investors, CFO.cOM, Oct. 21,
2004, available at LEXIS, News Library (studying the sales of new corporate bonds
to retail investors).
49 Kim, supra note 43, at D2.
50 A "foreign private issuer" is defined under the U.S. federal securities laws
as any issuer incorporated under the laws of any foreign country that is not a
foreign government, except if more than 50% of its outstanding voting securities
are directly or indirectly owned of record by U.S. residents and any of the
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including both registered and privately placed securities, must be
reported to the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
("NASD") within fifteen minutes after the transaction. This
information is available to the public through the NASD's Trade
Reporting and Compliance Engine ("TRACE") system.51 Price
information about corporate bond trades is immediately accessible
to retail investors, without charge, through an investor education
website.52
European issuers are increasingly turning to the bond markets
as an alternative source of financing. For example, Porsche AG
and other German companies raised almost $3.9 billion in U.S.
private placements of debt securities in the first half of 2004.53 Part
of the impetus for this has been the forty percent decrease in the
number of German banks between 1992 and 2003, which reduced
the pool of potential bank lenders, as well as the relative weakness
of the German banking sector during this period.54 This reduced
reliance on bank lending will undoubtedly become more
pronounced after July 2005, when the German state guarantee for
the state-owned regional banks (Landesbanken) and savings banks
(Sparkassen) expires. By improving the bond ratings of these banks,
this guarantee has been credited with allowing those banks to
reduce their cost of borrowing, thereby enabling them to lend
funds at very low rates.55 Recently, as a result of intensified issuer
interest in the retail market, some European issuers have actually
been targeting bond issuances to retail investors.
56
following: the majority of its executive officers or directors are U.S. citizens or
residents, more than 50% of its assets are located in the United States, or the
issuer's business is administered principally in the United States. 17 C.F.R. §
230.405 (2005) (Securities Act definition); 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-4(c) (2005) (Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 ("Exchange Act") definition).
51 THE BOND MKT. Ass'N, supra note 37, at 37. TRACE was launched on July 1,
2002. Id. Prior to July 1, 2005, the reporting time for trades was within 30 minutes
after the transaction. Id.
52 Press Release, The Bond Mkt. Ass'n, Association's Award-Winning
Investor Education Website, www.InvestinginBonds.com, Adds Free Real-Time
Corporate Bond Prices, Site Now Carries Free Corporate, Municipal & Treasury
Prices (Feb. 7, 2005), available at http://www.bondmarkets.com
/story.asp?id=1679.
53 O'Connor, supra note 36, at 30.
54 Id. at 32.
55 Id.
56 See Alexander Schaub, Financial Integration in EU25 - Lessons Learnt and
Prospects for the Future, Keynote Address at the Euro Symposium, Tokyo (Nov.
12, 2004), http://www.iima.or.jp/pdf/others/sympo_2004-1112/Speech%20text
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Nonetheless, compared to the U.S. markets, price transparency
is more limited for retail investors in the European bond markets.
Post-trade price information about transactions in European
sovereign and high-grade corporate bonds is more readily
available for institutional investors.
57
3. COMPARISON OF EU AND U.S. DEBT DISCLOSURE REGIMES
3.1. EU Initiatives
As the significance of the retail debt markets has grown, the
appropriate regulation of those markets has become increasingly
important.5 8  In the EU, securities regulators have recently
grappled with this issue in the context of their efforts to implement
the legislation set forth in the FSAP.
The International Accounting Standards Regulation (the
"Regulation") was one of the first legislative measures to be
adopted under the FSAP, and greatly affects the presentation of
financial information in prospectuses used in the EU. The
Regulation requires EU companies that are admitted to trading on
an EU regulated market to prepare their consolidated financial
statements according to the International Financial Reporting
Standards ("IFRS") that are set by the International Accounting
Standards Board ("IASB"), beginning on or after January 1, 2005.59
For an EU issuer that only has debt securities admitted on a
regulated market in any EU Member State, the provisions do not
%20Mr.%20Schaub.pdf (explaining how Dresdner Bank and UBS are targeting
smaller investors through the use of retail issuing platforms). See Batchelor, supra
note 25 (describing how some European companies have enthusiastically
converted to bond market funding since the euro's creation in 1999); De Teran,
supra note 42, at 49 (noting that the Prospectus Directive is expected to facilitate
development of the retail market in non-equity products).
57 THE BOND MKT. ASS'N, supra note 37, at 15.
58 See European Union, Activities of the European Union: Summaries of
Legislation -Financial Services Action Plan ("Fundamental change in the EU
financial markets is being driven mainly by wholesale services ... [but] the retail
sector is itself in the process of considerable adaptation."), available at
http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/124210.htm (last modified Mar. 4,
2004). See also Alexander Schaub, Financial Integration in EU25 - Lessons Learnt
and Prospects for the Future, Keynote Address at the Euro Symposium, Tokyo
(Nov. 12, 2004), at 3, http://www.iima.or.jp/pdf/others/sympo-2004_1112
/Speech%20text%20Mr.%20Schaub.pdf (discussing the progress of EU financial
integration after the implementation of the FSAP).
59 International Accounting Standards Regulation, supra note 19, art. 4.
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apply until the issuer's fiscal year starting on or after January
2007.60 Issuers whose securities are admitted to public trading
outside the EU, such as foreign companies, that have been using
"internationally accepted standards" since before the publication
date of the Regulation (i.e., July 2002), are also not required to use
IFRS until the fiscal year beginning on or after January 2007.61
Another legislative measure under the FSAP, the Market Abuse
Directive ("MAD" or the "Directive") was adopted by the
European Parliament and European Council in January 2003. This
Directive is aimed at promoting the smooth functioning of the EU
financial markets, as well as instilling greater public confidence in
those markets.62  The Directive does this by developing a
framework aimed at preventing market abuse in the EU (defined in
the Directive as insider trading and market manipulation),63 and
requires Member States to provide for the availability of
administrative sanctions for violations of the Directive.64 The
60 Id. art. 9.
61 Id. The Committee on European Securities Regulators ("CESR"), which
consists of staff members from the various EU securities regulatory agencies who
provide technical advice to the European Commission, published its technical
advice to the European Commission in June 2005. The CESR stated that U.S.
GAAP, Canadian GAAP, and Japanese GAAP qualify as equivalent accounting
standards to IFRS, although issuers using these GAAPs should be required to
provide additional descriptive and quantitative disclosures in certain areas. See
Committee of European Securities Regulators, Technical Advice on Equivalence
of Certain Third Country GAAP and on Description of Certain Third Countries'
Mechanisms of Enforcement of Financial Information, CESR/05-230b (June 2005),
available at http://www.cesr-eu.org/data/document/05_230b.pdf. Under the
Prospectus Directive and Transparency Directive, beginning on January 1, 2007,
non-EU issuers (e.g., third country issuers) who make a public offering of their
securities in the EU or who have their securities admitted to trading on an EU-
regulated market must prepare their financial statements according to EU-
endorsed IFRS or the third country's national accounting standards, if the
European Commission has declared such standards to be equivalent to IFRS. See
Prospectus Directive, supra note 17, art. 20 (laying out the guidelines for
admission to trading on a regulated market for issuers incorporated in third
countries); Prospectus Implementing Regulation, supra note 17, art. 35 (explaining
that the obligation to restate historical financial information in a prospectus does
not apply to any period earlier than January 1, 2006); Transparency Directive,
supra note 18, arts. 23, 30 (stating the exemptions for issuers incorporated in third
countries).
62 Market Abuse Directive, supra note 16, recital 2.
63 Id. recital 12.
64 Id. art. 14. Prior to the Market Abuse Directive ("MAD"), criminal
sanctions for insider trading were commonly available to authorities in Member
States, but civil sanctions were not as widely available. Some commentators have
argued that civil sanctions are arguably more effective in combating insider
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adoption of one consistent framework for combating market abuse
is expected to eliminate inconsistencies among national
requirements, as well as possible loopholes. MAD also establishes
the basic disclosure principle for issuers that all inside information
should be disclosed to the public as soon as possible, unless one of
the exemptions set forth in that Directive applies.65 EU member
states were required to adopt legislation at a national level to
implement this Directive into national law by October 12, 2004.66
Within that basic framework, the EU adopted the Prospectus
Directive in November 2003. This directive sets forth a single set of
disclosure requirements for prospectuses that are used for public
offerings of securities or when securities are admitted to trading on
EU regulated markets, 67 and is to be implemented into national
regulations by EU members no later than July 1, 2005.68
Implementation of the Prospectus Directive is a crucial step in the
EU's efforts to make the financial markets competitive globally.
Under the Prospectus Directive, a prospectus that is approved for
use in one EU Member State can be used in all other EU Member
States without the imposition of additional disclosure
requirements by the regulatory authorities in the other Member
trading than criminal sanctions because an insider trading case is most often
developed through the use of circumstantial evidence and the legal standard for
prevailing in a civil case is lower than in a criminal proceeding. See Thomas C.
Newkirk & Melissa A. Robertson, Speech by SEC Staff: Insider Trading-A U.S.
Perspective, Remarks at the 16th International Symposium on Economic Crime
(Sept. 19, 1998), http:// www.sec.gov/news/speech/speecharchive/1998/
spch221.htm (comparing MAD to U.S. government approaches to combat insider
trading). The requirement that civil sanctions be available for violations of MAD
should enhance the effectiveness of authorities in prosecuting market abuse cases
in the EU.
65 Market Abuse Directive, supra note 16, art. 6(1). "Inside information" is
defined to be "information of a precise nature which has not been made public,
relating, directly or indirectly, to one or more issuers of financial instruments or to
one or more financial instruments and which, if it were made public, would be
likely to have a significant effect on the prices of those financial instruments." Id.
art. 1(1).
66 Id. art. 18. Although most EU Member States were not able to transpose
the Directive into national legislation by the October deadline, they are widely
expected to do so by the second quarter of 2005. See Press Release, U.K. Financial
Services Agency, What's New, at http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/About/What/
International/EU/fsap/mad/new/index.shtml (last updated July 4, 2005)
(reporting it is likely that the full implementation of the Market Abuse Directive
will occur during the second quarter of 2005).
67 Prospectus Directive, supra note 17, art. 1(1).
68 Id. art. 29.
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States, and without a further approval process. In other words, an
approved prospectus may be used as a "passport" by an issuer
seeking access to multiple EU markets. This framework is
expected to reduce capital raising costs for issuers because they
will not have to comply with a myriad of conflicting disclosure
requirements throughout the EU, thereby fostering the efficiency
and competitiveness of the integrated EU financial market.
Under the Prospectus Directive, issuers seeking to publicly
offer or admit securities for trading on a regulated market in the
EU prepare a prospectus that must be approved by the competent
authority 69 in its "home Member State," i.e., the EU country in
which an EU company has its registered office. 70 For issuers of
debt-only securities in which the denomination per unit equals or
exceeds 1,000 euros, however, the home Member State is the EU
country in which the issuer has its registered office, in which the
securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market, or in
which the securities are offered to the public. The issuer, offeror,
or person seeking admission to trading, as relevant, selects the
home Member State.71 For non-EU issuers, the home Member State
is the EU country in which securities are first offered to the public
or where admission to trading is first sought after the Prospectus
Directive's effective date. 72  Once the prospectus has been
approved, the issuer can request the competent authority of the
home Member State to send a notice of this approval to the
competent authority in any other EU Member State-i.e., "host
Member State,"-in which it wants to make a public offering or
have its securities admitted to trading.73 The competent authority
69 In the past, some European countries had several governmental entities
that could be viewed as a "competent authority." The Prospectus Directive makes
clear the preference for one independent governmental entity to be viewed as a
"competent authority" for the purpose of that Directive. Id. art. 21.
70 Id. art. 2(1)(m)(i).
71 Id. art. 2(1)(m)(ii). In the Prospectus Directive, "offeror" is defined as the
legal entity or person that actually offers the securities to the public, such as an
investment bank. Id. art. 2(1)(i). See also Kalderon & Hope, supra note 21, at 15
(noting that the Prospectus Directive imposes clear liability on investment banks,
where previously their liability was somewhat uncertain).
72 Foreign issuers designate an EU Member State as home Member State by
filing a prospectus with the competent authority in that State. Once a Member
State has been selected, it becomes the permanent home Member State for all
future prospectuses. Prospectus Directive, supra note 17, art. 2(1)(m)(iii). Foreign
issuers that already have securities admitted to trading on an EU regulated
market must select a home Member State by December 31, 2005. Id. art. 30.
73 Id. art. 18.
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in the host Member State may not require additional information
in the prospectus, 74 although the Member State, competent
authority, or listing authority for the regulated market on which
the securities will be admitted for trading may request more
disclosure in the context of admitting the securities to trading on a
regulated market.
75
One of the challenges for the EU has been to develop a
regulatory regime that ensures investor protection without putting
the EU markets at a competitive disadvantage vis-A-vis non-EU
markets. Although most corporate bonds in the EU are sold to
institutional investors in the wholesale market, because these
bonds are often listed to obtain various tax treatments and satisfy
investment restrictions, 76 the Prospectus Directive will apply to
them.77  As a result, the prospectus disclosure requirements
attempt to protect retail investors who may be investing in a
security without creating undue burdens for issuances that are
targeted primarily to institutional investors.
One of the premises of the EU disclosure architecture that is
noted in MAD78 and is an explicit basis for the "building blocks"
approach used in the Prospectus Directive is that the level of
disclosure that is provided by issuers should be tailored to the
investors' circumstances. For instance, because both retail and
institutional investors presumably purchase shares in anticipation
of receiving capital gains on their investment when they sell their
securities, they are viewed as being particularly interested in the
operations and financial prospects of the issuer. Under the
74 Id. art. 17.
75 Id. recital 15.
76 See note 39 and accompanying text.
77 The Prospectus Directive contains a number of exemptions for certain
types of offers, such as offers that are solely made to "qualified investors" (as
defined in the Prospectus Directive, supra note 17, art. 2(1)(e)), offers addressed to
fewer than 100 natural or legal persons per Member State (excluding qualified
investors), and offers to investors who purchase securities for a total consideration
of at least 50,000 euros. Id. art. 3(2). In addition, a public offer in which total
consideration paid over a twelve-month period is below 2.5 million euros is
exempt from the Prospectus Directive requirements. Id. art. 1(2)(h). An issuer
that has bonds admitted to trading on a regulated exchange would need to
publish a prospectus in any case. Certain types of securities are also exempted
from the application of the Prospectus Directive, such as certain non-equity
securities issued in a continuous or repeated manner by credit institutions. Id. art.
1(2).
78 Market Abuse Directive, supra note 16, recital 43.
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Prospectus Directive, share issuers are thus required to disclose
information about their financial condition, any known trends or
uncertainties that are reasonably likely to have a material effect on
their prospects, and extensive information about their
administrative, management, and supervisory bodies, among other
things. 79
On the other hand, retail investors in publicly issued and listed
debt securities are expected to hold the securities until maturity,
particularly because of the more limited secondary market in the
EU for resales of corporate debt securities by non-institutional
investors. 80 These investors are viewed as primarily interested in
information about the issuer's historical financial information, the
terms of the debt securities, and the terms and conditions of the
offering, rather than extensive information about the issuer's
operations. Their disclosure needs are presumably limited to
information about the issuer's ability to pay interest on the debt
securities and to pay the principal on the corporate bonds, not to
any potential profit from resales of the bonds in the secondary
markets. Moreover, debt investors are viewed as subject to less
investment risk because they have priority over equity holders in
obtaining payments on any outstanding obligations on the debt if
an issuer becomes insolvent. As a result, prospectuses for listings
and public debt offerings in which retail investors may be able to
participate are not required to include MD&A,81 information about
the remuneration and benefits paid to members of their
administrative, management, or supervisory bodies, or related-
party transactions. These disclosure items are all required for
prospectuses relating to shares.
Moreover, the Prospectus Directive further differentiates
79 Prospectus Implementing Regulation, supra note 17, Annex I.
80 See Batchelor, Wallflowers of the Markets, supra note 41 (noting that bonds in
Europe primarily trade off the exchange in large volumes and on terms that are
difficult for retail investors to comprehend, thereby limiting the involvement of
retail investors in the secondary market).
81 EU Member States use different terminology to refer to Management's
Discussion and Analysis ("MD&A"). For example, in the United Kingdom, this
disclosure is referred to as "Operating and Financial Review." See, e.g., U.K. DEP'T
OF TRADE AND INDUS., DRAFT REGULATIONS ON THE OPERATING AND FINANCIAL
REVIEW AND DIRECTORS' REPORT: A CONSULTATIVE DOCUMENT 6 (May 2004),
available at http://www.dti.gov.uk /consultations/files/publication-1177.pdf
(defining the Operating and Financial Review as "a narrative report by quoted
companies that will be made annually to shareholders, setting out the principal
drivers of a company's performance both in the past and in the future").
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required disclosures for debt offerings according to the level of
sophistication of the expected investor. Prospectuses for public
offerings and listings of debt securities with a denomination per
unit of at least 50,000 euros, which are more likely to be purchased
by institutional or wholesale investors, may contain less
information than prospectuses for offerings and listings of debt
securities with a denomination per unit of less than 50,000 euros,
which are more likely to be accessible to retail investors.82 This
structure addresses concerns raised when the Prospectus Directive
was proposed that listed Eurobond deals, which are primarily
targeted to the wholesale market, would require prospectuses that
are as detailed as prospectuses for offerings directed to retail
investors. 83
Even with a disclosure framework that tries to balance
concerns over investor protection against the desire to safeguard
the EU's dominance of the Eurobond market, competition for that
market will most likely only get fiercer as the new EU legislation is
implemented. Several Japanese issuers that have recently listed on
EU exchanges have insisted on dual-listing clauses that would
allow them to delist if they are required to prepare financial
statements under, or reconciled to, IFRS. With a dual listing, they
can opt out of the EU market at any time.84 These types of
concerns have spurred non-EU exchanges to develop programs to
entice non-EU issuers to list Eurobonds on their markets. The SWX
Swiss Exchange, for example, recently adopted rules that would
permit non-Swiss issuers to delist Eurobonds from an EU exchange
and immediately relist them on the SWX Swiss Exchange, using
abbreviated prospectuses that contain financial statements based
on their most recent annual reports. Moreover, the financial
statements can be prepared according to any number of accounting
standards, including IFRS, Swiss GAAP, U.S. GAAP, and Japanese
GAAP.85 The Hong Kong Stock Exchange 86 and the Singapore
82 See Prospectus Implementing Regulation, supra note 17, Annexes IV, V, IX,
XIII (detailing the schedules for minimum debt disclosure requirements).
83 See generally Michael Hoare, Eurobonds to Escape Prospectus Directive, FIN.
NEWS, Nov. 19, 2001, available at LEXIS, News Library (describing efforts to
exempt the Eurobond market from the Prospectus Directive in order to avoid
additional costs and burdens).
84 Evans, supra note 21, at 15.
85 See id. at 14 (explaining that the new rules will allow issuers to use
accounting standards other than Swiss or EU standards); Skorecki, supra note 20
(noting that prior to the new rules, the SWX Swiss Exchange had a small
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Stock Exchange 87 have also been successful in obtaining Eurobond
listings by Asian issuers.
To forestall the potential loss of market share in the Eurobond
market, exchanges in various EU Member States are developing
market segments that would not qualify as "regulated markets"
under the new EU legislation. Both the London Stock Exchange
and Luxembourg Stock Exchange are preparing to set up
alternative Eurobond markets that would be geared toward
professional investors and that would not qualify as "regulated
markets."88 The Alternative Investment Market ("AIM"), the
segment of the London Stock Exchange which lists equity
securities issued by smaller companies, has already changed its
status so that it no longer qualifies as an EU "regulated market."
89
3.2. Comparison to the U.S. Framework
In contrast to the EU's approach to prospectus disclosure, the
SEC requires corporate issuers to provide the same types of
information in prospectuses for equity and debt securities.90
Registered debt is freely tradable in the U.S. markets, so retail
investors in debt securities are viewed as having the same
Eurobond segment for Swiss issuers); Gillian Tett, Swiss Open Eurobond Score in
Challenge to London, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2005, at 1 (noting that the SWX Swiss
Exchange's efforts resulted in a Eurobond listing by Banco Itau, which marked the
first time that the Exchange succeeded in snaring a Eurobond listing from the
dominant EU markets).
86 See Skorecki, supra note 20 (explaining that some Asian issuers have
already switched exchanges, mostly to Hong Kong).
87 See Evans, supra note 21, at 15 (noting Singapore's success in attracting
Asian issuers that would have traditionally listed in Europe); Skorecki, supra note
20 (stating that some Asian issuers have switched exchanges to Singapore).
88 See Roby, supra note 21 (describing that the costs associated with new EU
rules are driving issuers to list with "exchange-regulated" markets in Europe). See
also Alison Smith, Swiss Role, FIN. TIMES, Mar. 31, 2005, at 22 (discussing the new
SWX Swiss Exchange rules and the London Stock Exchange's plan to establish a
similar professional securities market); Tett, supra note 85 (noting the London
Stock Exchange's plans to launch a self-regulated Eurobond market).
89 Brian Hanney, AIM Gets IAS Reprieve, ACCOUNTANCY, Nov. 1, 2004,
available at LEXIS, News Library; see Lisa Bushrod, AIM to Become Exchange-
Regulated Market, EUR. VENTURE CAP. J., June 2004, at 3 (detailing the changes at in
the Alternative Investment Market as a result of the new EU directives).
90 Unless there is an exemption from registration, issuers must register
securities that will be publicly offered with the SEC. The greater part of the
registration statement that is filed with the SEC consists of the prospectus. The
registration statement also includes exhibits and certain undertakings required by
Item 512 of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.512 (2005), among other things.
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informational needs as investors in shares. Because the issuer's
operations and prospects can affect the profitability of retail
investors' bond investment if they resell the debt prior to maturity,
the same type of information about the issuer is required in both
equity and debt prospectuses. In addition, even though debt
holders may stand in priority over equity holders with respect to
the issuer's assets if it ever becomes insolvent, companies may
favor shareholders over bondholders via enhanced dividends and
share buybacks during periods when their stock prices are low.91
Information about the company and its operations is thus viewed
as equally relevant to debt and equity holders. Moreover, because
so many securities products in the modem marketplace defy easy
classification, distinctions between equity and debt securities can
be difficult to draw.92 Applying different disclosure requirements
based on whether a particular type of security can be characterized
as primarily debt-like or primarily equity-like is impractical for a
market in which well over 13,000 corporate issuers93 are registered
with the SEC. 94
91 See Mark Whitehouse et al., The Sky Darkens for Bondholders, WALL ST. J.,
May 12, 2005, at C1 (discussing the risks in the U.S. credit market, including
bondholder fears that executives may be lured by low stock prices into taking
actions that favor shareholders).
92 Cumulative preferred stock is a relatively simple example of this.
Although it is classified as equity, it has many characteristics more typical of debt
securities, e.g., dividends on cumulative preferred stock that are declared but not
paid out accumulate and must be paid before any dividends can be paid on
common stock, and holders of this type of stock have priority over holders of
common stock if the issuer's assets are liquidated.
93 See Management's Reports on Internal Control Over Financial Reporting
and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Securities Act
Release No. 8238, Exchange Act Release No. 47,986, Investment Company Act
Release No. 26,068 [2003 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,923, at
87,676, 87,705 June 5, 2003) (imposing additional disclosure requirements on
certain corporations and estimating the eventual number of forms received to be
in the tens of thousands).
94 Although as a general principle equity and debt securities are subject to the
same basic disclosure requirements, such as business information about the issuer
and unique terms or characteristics of the securities, special disclosure
requirements do exist for a few unique securities, such as asset-backed securities.
The SEC has recently adopted special rules and forms for asset-backed securities
because the nature of asset-backed issuers and securities differs greatly from
operating companies and corporate securities. See Asset-Backed Securities,
Securities Act Release No. 8518, Exchange Act Release No. 50,905, [2004-2005
Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 87,323, at 81,573 (Dec. 22, 2004)
("adopting new and amended rules and forms to address comprehensively the
registration, disclosure and reporting requirements for asset-backed
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Not only does the SEC require issuers to provide the same
types of information in prospectuses for equity and debt securities,
but generally the same types of information must be provided by
issuers in the annual reports that they file with the SEC. 95 One of
the innovative premises behind the SEC's integrated disclosure
system96 is the notion that purchasers of securities in the primary
market and secondary markets should receive the same
information. Not only is there no differentiation in the disclosure
required based on the type of securities offered or listed by an
issuer, but there is also no distinction drawn between the
information provided for an initial public offering and the
information provided on an ongoing basis to the public. Because
no distinction is drawn, issuers that are already reporting with the
SEC are able to use short-form registration statements that
incorporate by reference periodic reports previously filed by an
issuer with the SEC in order to go to market more quickly with
their public offering. In addition, all filings with the SEC must be
made through its Electronic Data Gathering and Retrieval system
("EDGAR"),97 and are immediately available to the public at no
charge through the SEC's website. As a result, full disclosure
about a company is available to the public as soon as the company
makes an offering or listing in the U.S. markets, so that full
information is available to all participants in the secondary markets
contemporaneously with the SEC filing. This facilitates immediate
liquidity of the securities in the secondary markets.98 On an
securities .... ).
95 Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. §§ 229.10-.915 (2005), sets forth the core
requirements for prospectuses used by U.S. companies. The various SEC
registration statement forms that these issuers use for public offerings and
listings, as well as the annual report Form 10-K, 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 (2005),
incorporate selected requirements from Regulation S-K. For foreign private
issuers, Form 20-F, 17 C.F.R. § 249.220f (2005), available at
http://www.sec.gov/about/forms/form20-f.pdf, contains the core requirements
for prospectuses used by these issuers in public offerings and listings in the
United States, and is also the annual report form for these issuers.
96 Adoption of Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act Release No. 6383,
Exchange Act Release No. 18,524, Investment Company Act Release No. 12,264,
[1937-1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,328, at 62,990 (Mar. 3,
1982); Adoption of Foreign Issuer Integrated Disclosure Sys., 47 Fed. Reg. 54,764
(Nov. 19, 1982).
97 17 C.F.R. §§ 232.14, 232.100-.101 (2005).
98 Cf. Joel Seligman, The Obsolescence of Wall Street: A Contextual Approach to
the Evolving Structure of Federal Securities Regulation, 93 MICH. L. REV. 649, 683
(1995) (noting that the SEC's integrated disclosure system is based on the efficient
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ongoing basis, the same full disclosure about an issuer that was
contained in the prospectus is provided to the secondary markets
through the issuer's annual reports.
This approach contrasts with the approach taken by the EU
with respect to the ongoing disclosure obligations of issuers.
Under the Transparency Directive,99 companies with equity or debt
securities 00 admitted to trading on an EU regulated market will be
required to file annual financial reports that contain audited
financial statements, 101 and half-yearly financial reports that
contain a condensed set of financial statements that need not be
audited as long as the issuer makes clear in the report that auditors
have not audited or reviewed the report.0 2 Both of these reports
will consist primarily of the issuer's financial statements and a
management report 03 In addition, these reports must contain
statements made by persons responsible for the report within the
issuer that to the best of their knowledge the financial statements
contained in the report give a "true and fair view" of the issuer's
financial position and the management's report gives a "fair
review" of the information required 04  Consistent with the
approach taken in the Prospectus Directive, share issuers are
subject to slightly more disclosure requirements under the
Transparency Directive than issuers of only debt, reflecting EU
regulators' concerns that equity securities present more of an
investment risk. An issuer with shares admitted to trading on an
EU regulated market must also publish interim management
statements at six-month intervals that explain material events and
market hypothesis and "that information effectively disseminated to the public
will be rapidly reflected in share prices regardless of the source of the data").
99 The Transparency Directive must be implemented into national legislation
by January 20, 2007. Transparency Directive, supra note 18, art. 31(1).
100 In the Transparency Directive, "debt securities" are defined as bonds or
other forms of transferable securitized debt, except for securities that are
equivalent to shares or that may be converted into shares or securities that are
equivalent to shares. Id. art. 2(1)(b).
101 Id. art. 4(2)(a).
102 Id. art. 5(5).
103 Id. arts. 4(2)(a)-(b), 5(2)(a)-(b). The interim management report included
in the half-yearly financial report must disclose the important events that
occurred in the first six months of the financial year, their effect on the condensed
financial statements, and a description of the main risks and uncertainties faced
by the issuer for the remainder of the financial year. Issuers of shares must also
include a description of major related-party transactions. Id. art. 5(4).
104 Id. arts. 4(2)(c), 5(2)(c).
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transactions during the covered period that had an impact on the
issuer's financial position, as well as a general description of the
issuer's financial position and performance during the covered
period.105 However, share issuers that publish quarterly financial
reports, whether as a result of national law or voluntarily, are
exempt from the requirement to file interim management
statements.106 Unlike the Prospectus Directive, the Transparency
Directive is a "minimum harmonization" directive, which means
that home Member States may impose additional requirements
that they deem necessary on issuers incorporated in their
jurisdictions.
107
4. LEGAL FRAMEWORK IMPLICATIONS
Disclosure frameworks are not just affected by market
considerations. The legal environment in which issuers operate
also affects the disclosure regime in a country. The EU Prospectus
Directive has more fluidity built into its structure in part because
issuers in Europe have been insulated from the massive
shareholder class actions that have plagued their brethren
operating in the United States. This enables regulators to
implement disclosure obligations that can be characterized as
"principles-based," rather than being oriented toward more
detailed disclosure requirements. In contrast, the threat of
securities class action litigation is a serious consideration for
issuers operating in the United States, so the disclosure framework
provides more guidance to issuers as to what would be viewed as
material information that must be disclosed in a prospectus. The
U.S. disclosure regime is thus often described as "rules-based." In
truth, of course, the characterization of a disclosure regime as
either principles-based or rules-based is essentially just a difference
in degree. In reality, every disclosure regime has elements of both
systems: a "principles-based" regime still contains certain detailed
line items and a "rules-based" regime prescribes detailed
disclosures against a framework of general principles.
Nonetheless, the legal framework of a jurisdiction greatly impacts
the shape of its securities regulations.
105 Id. art. 6(1).
106 Id. art. 6(2).
107 Id. art. 3(1).
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4.1. U.S. Legal Framework
One of the hallmarks of the SEC's prospectus disclosure regime
is the precise guidance contained in its disclosure requirements.
This reflects, in part, the highly litigious environment in which
issuers in the United States must operate. In the United States,
litigation is well-recognized as a profitable business in and of itself,
an inadvertent manifestation of the cultural emphasis on the right
of an individual to protect her interests.
108
Historically, reliance on litigation as a means of protecting
one's rights developed as a response to the social welfare problems
of the early twentieth century. Since private insurance coverage
for personal injuries was not common in the United States in the
early 1900s, individuals who were harmed by the poor working
conditions in the industrialized workplace or by defective products
were eventually encouraged by pro-plaintiff judicial decisions to
resort to the courts as a means of creating "social insurance." 10 9
Some academics even proposed using tort liability as a means of
providing market incentives that would ostensibly encourage
manufacturers to improve the safety of their production processes
or the products themselves, that is, a form of market-based
regulation u 0
This belief in the importance of enabling individuals to protect
and enforce their rights, instead of relying solely on enforcement
by the government, is evident in the framework of the federal
securities laws. Indeed, Congress recognized that the market crash
108 The availability of effective legal remedies reflects the "cultural
preference" and respect that the U.S. courts and legislature have accorded to
individualism. See Jeswald W. Salacuse, Corporate Governance in the New Century,
25 COMPANY L. 3, 69, 76, 82 (2004) (discussing individualism as a U.S. cultural
value that plays out in a legal emphasis on individual rights and remedies).
109 See Mike France, How to Fix the Tort System, Bus. WK., Mar. 14, 2005, at 70,
74 (explaining the rationale of progressives and New Dealers for expanding tort
liability); Michael L. Rustad & Thomas H. Koenig, Taming the Tort Monster: The
American Civil Justice System as a Battleground of Social Theory, 68 BROOK. L. REV. 1,
25-49 (2002) (tracing the expansion of corporate liability under tort law from the
early nineteenth century to 1980).
110 France, supra note 109, at 74. See generally WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD
A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW (1987) (suggesting that
statutory tort law is designed to promote efficient behavior); Guido Calabresi,
Some Thoughts on Risk Distribution and the Law of Torts, 70 YALE L. J. 499, 519-24
(1961) (discussing the economic consequences of "enterprise liability" for
accidents); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Positive Economic Theory of
Tort Law, 15 GA. L. REV. 851, 852-57 (1981) (considering whether negligence or
strict liability is the most efficient standard in tort law).
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of 1929 decimated the lifetime savings of many individual
investors."1 As a result, the federal securities laws provide all
investors, from the retired senior citizen in Booneville, Missouri, to
the large hedge fund in New York City, with the ability to bring a
private action, if necessary, to enforce their rights as investors.11 2
Both the Securities Act and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
("Exchange Act") expressly provide for private rights of action by
injured investors.11 3 Although it may be cost prohibitive for
individual investors to pursue legal actions against a company, the
ease with which class actions may be brought in the United States
has made individual investor enforcement of claims a reality." 4
The ensuing explosion in class action litigation, including
claims based on the securities laws, that occurred throughout the
twentieth century has famously led to calls by business to rein in
frivolous class action lawsuits."5 When he signed the Class Action
111 See James D. Cox & Randall S. Thomas, SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An
Empirical Inquiry, 53 DUKE L.J. 737, 743 n.17 (2003) (noting Congressional views on
the "thousands of individual investors who lost their life savings").
112 See id. at 743 (describing the role of the Great Depression and a lack of
private enforcement capacity at the time in spurring changes in the securities
laws).
113 Securities Act § 11(a), 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a) (2000); Securities Act § 12(a)(1), 15
U.S.C. § 771(a)(1) (2000); Exchange Act § 18(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78r(a) (2000). See also
Exchange Act § 10(b), 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2000) (implying a private right of action).
Cf. Cox & Thomas, supra note 111, at 739 (noting that the Supreme Court at one
point characterized the plaintiff in such an action as a "private attorney general").
114 See generally James D. Cox, Making Securities Fraud Class Actions Virtuous,
39 ARIZ. L. REV. 497, 497 (1997) ("Few things are as American as the class action.").
In addition, injured investors are better able to pursue a claim in the United States
than in other jurisdictions because contingent fee arrangements, in which the
attorney for the plaintiff only collects fees if the plaintiff wins, are accepted
practice. This reduces any cost barrier that might otherwise discourage individual
investors from pursuing their claims. See generally John C. Coffee, Jr.,
Understanding the Plaintiffs Attorney: The Implications of Economic Theoryfor Private
Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669, 677-
84 (1986) (explaining the economic incentives the class action system creates for
plaintiffs' attorneys). In Europe, the usual practice is for the loser to pay the legal
fees of the winning party, a practice that effectively reduces frivolous claims.
Heather Smith, Shareholders, Unite!, AM. LAW., May 2005, at 118; Directors and
Officers Insurance Market Set To Grow In United Kingdom, BESTWIRE, Feb. 20, 2004,
available at LEXIS, News Library; see also Thomas Rouhette & Amanda Croushore,
View from Here: Proposing to Take Action, LEGAL WK., Jan. 27, 2005, available at
http://www.legalweek.com/ViewItem.asp?id=22793 (describing alternative pro-
tections against spurious claims employed in the French legal system).
115 Since the enactment of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of
1995, 15 U.S.C. §77z-1 (2000), at least 2,322 issuers have been named in federal
class action securities fraud lawsuits. Stanford Law School Securities Class Action
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Fairness Act of 2005 into law in February 2005,116 which is expected
to reduce the number of class action lawsuits, President George W.
Bush asserted that frivolous lawsuits resulted in legal bills, civil
awards, and settlements that totaled approximately $240 billion
each year in the United States."
7
Issuers in the United States face the threat of litigation not only
from investors, but also from federal and state law enforcement
authorities. Enforcement actions for violations of the securities
laws are brought by the SEC, the U.S. Department of Justice (for
criminal matters), and the various states' attorneys general (for
violations of state law). In its 2003 fiscal year, the SEC obtained
orders in judicial and administrative proceedings that resulted in
disgorgement from securities violators of approximately $900
million in illegal profits and $1.1 billion in penalties. The SEC also
sought orders to bar 170 individuals from serving as officers or
directors of public companies.118
In this environment, more detailed disclosure rules have been
developed to provide issuers with a minimal level of guidance as
to what is considered material information that should be
disclosed in their prospectuses, registration statements, and other
SEC filings. Because the issuer, its directors, named experts,
Clearinghouse, http://securities.stanford.edu (last visited Oct. 23, 2005).
116 The Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005),
attempts to reduce frivolous class action lawsuits and forum shopping, as well as
to restrict class settlements that result in most of the compensation awarded in the
lawsuit being paid out to the attorneys representing the class rather than the
putative plaintiffs. David McDowell, President Bush Passes Class Action Fairness
Act, LEGAL WK., Mar. 24, 2005, available at http://www.legalweek.com
/ Viewltem.asp?id=23524.
117 See Laurence Frost, Will the French Say 'Oui' to U.S.-Style Class Actions?
Maybe, Associated Press (Apr. 15, 2005), available at http://www.law.com/jsp
/article.jsp?id=1113469509600 (describing lobbying efforts by French consumer
groups for class action reform).
118 U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, SEC 2003 ANNUAL REPORT 15
(2003), available at http://www.sec.gov/pdf/annrep03/ar03enforce.pdf.
Recently, the New York Attorney General has also been particularly successful in
his prosecution of securities-related actions. See generally Michael Gormley, State
Collects $12.4 Million from Wall Street, Fox23NEWS.coM, Aug. 25, 2003,
http://www.fox23news.com/news/local/story.aspx?contentid=2FD51BEC-
AFD1-41D1-84BC-4D7D6726EF82 (reporting on a $12.4 million settlement
agreement with Wall Street brokerages alleged to have inflated stock ratings);
Louise Schiavone, Spitzer Poised to Probe Grasso Pay, CNN.MONEY.COM, Jan. 8,
2004, http://money.cnn.com/2004/O1/08/markets/spitzer-grasso (addressing
the SEC's and New York Attorney General's intent to examine the compensation
package of former New York Stock Exchange Chairman Richard Grasso).
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underwriters, and any person who signed the registration
statement have liability for material misstatements or omissions
contained in the prospectus," 9 a disclosure regime that consisted
primarily of general disclosure principles would essentially leave
issuers vulnerable to innumerable investor lawsuits that could
hamper their ability to operate or function effectively. 20 It would
not be feasible to tailor disclosure requirements on a case-by-case
basis for specific issuers or specific securities products, given the
limited staff resources of the SEC compared to the number of
registered issuers.
4.2. EU Legal Framework.
In most European countries, investors are not able to pursue a
class action claim against an issuer's senior management and
directors in the same fashion as is permitted in the United States.
The ownership of many EU companies is relatively concentrated,
so that controlling shareholders have the financial incentive and
clout to deal directly with the companies in which they invest to
protect their interests. These investors have less need to resort to
formal legal action against an issuer as a means of protecting their
rights.' 2' Nonetheless, some European countries permit investors
to join together in a group to bring a single action. However, the
individual claims often still have to be evaluated separately, and a
judgment rendered on one claim will not be binding on the entire
group. Issuers are essentially forced to litigate or settle against
each plaintiff in the class individually.
This is certainly the case in France, Spain, Italy, and
Germany.122 Although France permits a collective suit known as
119 Securities Act § 11, 15 U.S.C. § 77k (2000).
120 See Alan L. Beller, Dir. Div. of Corp. Fin., SEC, Regulation in a Global
Environment, Remarks Before the American Academy in Berlin (Apr. 20, 2004),
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spchalb042004.htm (noting that the SEC
declined to adopt a current reporting requirement to disclose all material
developments because of "the U.S. enforcement scheme and because of concerns
that a more general requirement would cause excessive compliance burdens and
costs").
121 Craig, supra note 24, at 122.
122 See John C. Coffee, Jr., Racing Towards the Top? The Impact of Cross-Listings
and Stock Market Competition on International Corporate Governance, 102 COLUM. L.
REV. 1757, 1780, 1780 n.93 (2002) (observing that few jurisdiction outside the
United States recognize class actions; however, firms that cross-list on a United
States stock are subject to class actions); Smith, supra note 114 (describing Judge
Wbsthoff's strategy of hearing ten securities suits at once while awaiting
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"en representation conjointe," in which a group of plaintiffs brings a
single action, each plaintiff is still required to present her
individual claim and each claim must be evaluated separately.
Because of these and other procedural restrictions, this procedure
is used only sparingly.1 23 In Spain and Italy, U.S.-style class actions
against an issuer are not permitted. Moreover, shareholders may
bring derivative actions (lawsuits in which shareholders sue a third
party on behalf of the company) only if they hold at least five
percent of the issuer's shares, among other requirements. 124 For
companies with a large public float, this ownership requirement
effectively forestalls minority shareholder action.
The lack of a class action mechanism translates into a
substantially lower threat of litigation for issuers in Europe, and
arguably less protection of minority shareholders. At the same
time, however, when issuers are not haunted by the specter of
potential litigation by investors for disclosures they make in a
prospectus, the disclosure framework can provide issuers with
more leeway to determine what information is material to
investors and must be disclosed. This approach can be seen in the
EU's approach to developing prospectus disclosure requirements
for new types of securities that would not be adequately covered
by the schedules contained in the new regulations. Under the new
regulations, the content of prospectuses for offerings or requests
for admission to trading of new types of securities that cannot be
classified under any of the existing schedules will be negotiated
between the issuer and the relevant competent authority.125 The
EU regulation that implements the Prospectus Directive indicates
that the competent authority of the home Member State shall
decide "in consultation with the issuer, the offeror or the person
requesting admission to trading" what information should be
included for a new type of security that would not be adequately
covered by the schedules or building blocks in the Regulation.126
As a general matter, the prospectus disclosure requirements are
legislation that allows a type of class action in Germany).
123 See Rouhette & Croushore, supra note 114 (addressing the limitations of
the French 'action en representation conjointe,' or 'action in joint representation,'
system).
124 Ashley McKean, Corporate Governance in Spain: A Vibrant Transition Fueled
by the Recent Reforms of Aldama, 35 GEO. J. INT'L. L. 105, 120 (2003); Italian Need for
Corporate Governance Reform Increases in Wake of Parmalat, supra note 24.
125 Prospectus Implementing Regulation, supra note 17, recital 23.
126 Id. art. 23(3).
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predicated on the notion that the appropriate content of any given
prospectus will be determined by a combination of schedules,
depending on the nature of the issuer, the type of securities, and
the involvement of a third party guarantor, among other things.127
The whole "building blocks" approach, in which different
schedules are applied to different types of securities, is essentially
premised on flexible prospectus requirements that can be
negotiated on an individual basis.128
Although issuers in some countries have been effectively
shielded from minority shareholder suits, recent initiatives in
several EU member countries indicate that this may be changing.
In 2002, Sweden enacted legislation to permit a form of class
action.129 One chamber of the Dutch Parliament recently passed
legislation that would make a settlement between a defendant and
members of a class binding for all members of the class who have
not opted out, unlike the current system in which defendants must
litigate or reach settlements with each plaintiff individually. 130 In
January 2005, President Jacques Chirac announced proposals to
introduce a type of class action lawsuit in France that would
permit claims of a group of plaintiffs to be evaluated at the same
time, instead of on a case-by-case basis.' 31 Lawmakers in Germany
are currently considering reforms to permit shareholders to sue
senior managers of an issuer and to permit groups of shareholders
127 Id. recital 6.
128 Id. art. 23. This flexible regulatory approach regarding the regulation of
new securities products could enhance the competitiveness of individual markets,
depending on the regulatory approach taken, but this could also eventually
undermine the "passport" framework established by the Prospectus Directive if
different EU Member States take different approaches.
129 Jbrgen Eklund, Sweden Product Liability, MONDAQ, July 11, 2003, available at
2003 WLNR 10821709; see Frost, supra note 117 (noting that a variant on class
actions had been recently legalized in Sweden).
130 See New Dutch Class-Action Law Could Hit Insurers, REACTIONS, Mar. 2005,
at 69 (noting that such legislation was under review at time of writing). See
generally Smith, supra note 114 (debating whether the benefits of Germany's
proposed class action legislation, such as judicial efficiency, outweigh the costs of
the legislation, such as more litigation).
131 See Rouhette & Croushore, supra note 114 (noting that safeguards within
the French legal system, such as a lack of contingency fees, a lack of punitive
damage awards, and rules of evidence that reduce the chance that frivolous
claims will be brought, reduce the opportunity for abuses of the proposed
system). See also Peggy Hollinger, France Mulls Allowing Class-Action Suits, FIN.
TIMES, Jan. 7, 2005, at 7 (highlighting the view that restrictions on contingency fees
would help France avoid frivolous lawsuits).
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to band together to sue a company.132 Italy also is reportedly
contemplating legislation to permit class actions.
133
It is unclear at this point the extent to which class actions will
be available for securities law claims in all of these jurisdictions, 34
but U.S. and U.K. institutional investor activists who have begun
investing in EU companies are already beginning to transport their
brand of activism through litigation to Europe. 135 They are likely
132 Carter Dougherty, Germany Taking Lead on Financial Disclosure; It Is First in
EU to Pass Tougher Laws, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 28, 2004, at 15. See also New
Dutch Class-Action Law Could Hit Insurers, supra note 130 (reporting that Germany
is considering legislation similar to that passed in the Netherlands); Hollinger,
supra note 131, at 7 ("German lawmakers are considering similar moves" to allow
for "collective legal action").
133 Cf. Frost, supra note 117 ("Britain and Sweden have recently opened their
courts to limited forms of class actions and Italy is considering them ... ").
134 The main impetus for these initiatives appears to be concerns about
enhancing consumer protection in financial services to counteract the perception
that consumers have difficulty enforcing their rights and seeking redress in
Europe. Christa Randzio-Plath, Europe Prepares for a Single Financial Market,
INTERECONOMICS, May/June, 2004, at 142. One commentator has noted that the
threat of forum shopping among EU countries could eventually result in the
enactment of EU-level legislation permitting class actions. See, e.g., Richard 0.
Faulk, Armageddon Through Aggregation? The Use and Abuse of Class Actions in
International Dispute Resolution, 37 TORT & INs. L.J. 999, 1020 (2002) (arguing that
since most European Community Member States must enforce judgments
rendered by other Member States, the enactment of class action rules in any single
State effectively permits class actions by the citizens of all Member States). But see
Frost, supra note 117 (outlining arguments against France altering its rules to
allow class actions).
135 When Procter & Gamble Company made a takeover bid for Wella AG in
2003, a U.S. hedge fund sued the acquirer for discriminating between minority
(holders of preference shares) and majority (holders of ordinary shares)
shareholders. Sylvia Pfeifer, Elliott Takes BaFin To Court Over Wella Offer, Bus.,
June 8, 2003, at 6, available at LEXIS, News Library; see also Michael D. Goldhaber,
Merger Meisters: Minority Shareholders Got Creamed in Two Recent Cosmetics Deals.
Even Botox Couldn't Hide The Flaws in the New German Takeover Law, AM. LAW., Apr.
2004, at 124, 124-27 (describing the history, process, and people involved in the
suit); BAFIN, ANNUAL REPORT '03 206 (2003), available at
http://www.bafin.de/jahresbericht/jb03-en.pdf (remarking that BaFin's decision
that minority shareholders had no standing to oppose the deal in the courts had
been affirmed by the judiciary); Susan Hansen, Battling the New Takeover Law,
FocusEUROPE: AM. LAW. MEDIA SuPP., Fall 2003, at 7, 7-9 (indicating that a hedge
fund holding nonvoting shares planned to raise constitutional arguments and
discussing German law in the area of corporate takeovers). Cf. Quinton, supra
note 24, at 55, 58 (noting that European shareholders may benefit from U.S. and
U.K. investors "exporting" the activism they normally employ in their home
markets); Norma Cohen & Patrick Jenkins, Seifert's Downfall: How a Shareholder
Revolt Sent His Plans For Deutsche Bdrse Up In Smoke, FIN. TIMES, May 25, 2005, at 15
(analyzing how a failed Deutsche Borse deal resulted in part from "activist Anglo-
American investors").
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to test the limits of these new forms of collective legal action, which
could eventually result in pressure by issuers for more detailed
guidance in the prospectus disclosure requirements.
5. EFFECTS OF THESE FACTORS ON DEBT DISCLOSURE REQUIREMENTS
FOR PROSPECTUSES
The effect of each of these influences can be seen in how these
jurisdictions approach two significant disclosure topics: MD&A
and related-party transactions. After the recent financial frauds,
regulators in some jurisdictions expanded disclosure requirements
in these areas after concluding that improved disclosure could
have alerted the public to the irregular and, ultimately, fraudulent
practices of some issuers. Internationally, more attention has been
focused on the adequacy of MD&A in recent years. The IOSCO
International Disclosure Standards for Cross-Border Offerings and
Initial Listings by Foreign Issuers of equity securities, 136 which
were endorsed by IOSCO in 1998, established MD&A standards
for prospectuses used in cross-border offerings and listings. 37 In
February 2003, IOSCO also published a set of general principles on
MD&A that discussed the global regulatory consensus about the
importance of this disclosure. 38
Although regulators around the world are recognizing the
importance of these disclosure topics, there is no uniform approach
to soliciting such disclosures. An analysis of the EU and U.S. debt
disclosure frameworks illustrates how market characteristics, the
jurisdiction's general paradigm for regulating prospectus
disclosures, as well as the legal environment in which issuers must
operate, affect regulators' approach to these disclosure items.
5.1. Approaches to MD&A
MD&A provides management's narrative explanation of the
financial statements, and enables investors to see the company
136 IOSCO, International Disclosure Standards for Cross-Border Offerings and
Initial Listings by Foreign Issuers (Sept. 1998), http://www.iosco.org/library/
pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD81.pdf.
137 Id. at 3.
138 IOSCO TECHNICAL COMM., GENERAL PRINCIPLES REGARDING DISCLOSURE OF
MANAGEMENT'S DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS OF FINANCIAL CONDITION AND RESULTS OF
OPERATIONS 2-3 (Feb. 2003), available at http://www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs
/pdf /IOSCOPD141.pdf.
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through the eyes of management.139  Although the numbers
included in financial statements appear to provide hard, cold facts,
in reality the numbers alone cannot provide useful information
about known trends and uncertainties that are reasonably likely to
have a material effect on the issuer's financial condition or
operating performance. MD&A helps bridge the chasm between
pure financial numbers and investors' ability to assess the
company's prospects.
5.1.1. U.S. Approach
From its inception in the United States, MD&A was conceived
as a disclosure that would augment the information contained in
the financial statements, rather than being part of the financial
statements themselves. The first SEC guidance on MD&A-type
disclosure appeared in 1968 in the SEC's Guides for Preparation
and Filing of Registration Statements, which contained the policies
and practices of the SEC's Division of Corporation Finance.140 The
Guides recommended disclosure of a summary of earnings,
including a discussion of "unusual conditions that affected the
appropriateness of earnings presentation and footnotes indicating
adverse changes in operating results subsequent to the latest
period included in the earnings summary."141 A subsequent
revision was made to the Guides in 1974 to recommend that issuers
provide a "full narrative explanation of the summary to enable
investors to appraise the quality of earnings or operations."
142
Finally, in 1980 the SEC expanded and codified its guidance into a
disclosure requirement for Management's Discussion and Analysis
in Regulation S-K,143 which is the regulation that contains the
139 Id. at 2 (explaining how MD&A allows "investors and other users of
information to assess the financial condition" of the company).
140 See Concept Release on Management's Discussion and Analysis of
Financial Condition and Operations, Securities Act Release No. 6711, Exchange
Act Release No. 24,356 [1987 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,118, at
88,622 (Apr. 20, 1987) [hereinafter MD&A Concept Release] (describing the
evolution of the MD&A disclosure requirement from interpretive guidance to
required disclosure item in prospectuses and annual reports). See also Edmund
W. Kitch, The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 763, 799-
816 (1995) (discussing the history of the SEC's approach to MD&A).
141 MD&A Concept Release, supra note 140, at 88,622.
142 Id.
143 Amendments to Annual Report Form, Related Forms, Rules, Regulations,
and Guides; Integration of Securities Acts Disclosure Systems, Securities Act
Release No. 6231, Exchange Act Release No. 17,114, 45 Fed. Reg. 63,630 (Sept. 25,
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disclosure requirements applicable to prospectuses and annual
reports prepared by U.S. issuers. The new MD&A requirement
focused on disclosure of liquidity, capital resources, and results of
operations, with an emphasis on favorable or unfavorable trends
and on identification of significant events or uncertainties.'"
Since that time, the SEC has continued to view this disclosure
as one of the most significant disclosures provided by issuers, as
evidenced by the number of interpretative releases that the SEC
has published on MD&A. 145 Indeed, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002146 sought to address some of the abuses highlighted in the
recent financial frauds by requiring issuers to disclose off-balance
sheet transactions with unconsolidated entities in MD&A. 147 The
SEC subsequently expanded the MD&A requirement contained in
1980) [hereinafter Integration of Disclosure Systems Release]; see also Proposed
Revision of Regulation S-K and Guides for the Preparation and Filing of
Registration Statements and Reports, Securities Act Release No. 6276, Exchange
Act Release No. 17,399, 46 Fed. Reg. 78, 84 (Jan. 2, 1981) (suggesting that
codification would eliminate ambiguity about the legal effect of the Guides).
144 Integration of Disclosure Systems Release, supra note 143, at 63,636.
145 See, e.g., Commission Guidance Regarding Management's Discussion and
Analysis of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, Securities Act Release
No. 8350, Exchange Act Release No. 48,960, [2003-2004 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) 87,127, at 88,887 (Dec. 19, 2003) [hereinafter MD&A Guidance
Release] (providing a chronology of the SEC's formulation of its MD&A
requirements, and providing a comprehensive list of the SEC's interpretative
guidance and rulemakings in this area); Management's Discussion and Analysis
of Financial Condition and Results of Operations; Certain Investment Company
Disclosure, Securities Act Release No. 6835, Exchange Act Release No. 26,831, Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 72,436, at 62,143 (May 18, 1989) [hereinafter MD&A
Interpretive Release] (announcing the publication of an interpretive release for
MD&A); Disclosure in Management's Discussion and Analysis About Off-Balance
Sheet Arrangements and Aggregate Contractual Obligations, Securities Act
Release No. 8182, Exchange Act Release No. 47,264, [2002-2003 Transfer Binder]
Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,821, at 86,969 (Jan. 28, 2003) [hereinafter MD&A Final
Rule Release] (adding a new requirement for disclosure of off-balance sheet
transactions); Cautionary Advice Regarding Disclosure About Critical Accounting
Policies, Securities Act Release No. 8040, Exchange Act Release No. 45,149, [2001-
2002 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,609, at 85,097 (Dec. 12, 2001)
(notifying public companies that they should include a full explanation of their
critical accounting policies in their MD&A).
146 Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 (2002)
(codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.).
147 See id. at § 401(a) (to be codified at 15 U.S.C. § 78m(j)) (requiring that the
SEC promulgate rules mandating annual and quarterly reports to disclose
"material off-balance sheet transactions, arrangements, obligations (including
contingent obligations), and other relationships of the issuer with unconsolidated
entities or other persons").
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its prospectus disclosure requirements, so that issuers must now
disclose all material off-balance sheet transactions and
arrangements with unconsolidated entities that have, or are
reasonably likely to have, a current or future effect on the issuer's
financial condition, results of operations, or capital resources.148 In
addition, the SEC has taken several enforcement actions through
the years to underscore to issuers the importance of providing
adequate disclosures in this area.
49
Several factors contributed to the development of MD&A as a
crucial disclosure item in prospectuses for public debt offerings.
First, although the corporate debt market is dominated by
institutional investors, most of the investment grade debt is sold
through registered public offerings. 50 Once the debt securities are
registered, both retail and institutional investors are equally able to
purchase them. No attempt is made to differentiate among the
various types of investors who participate in a given offering. The
potential for participation by retail investors has been further
enhanced in recent years by improvements in the price
transparency of retail bond trades. Second, since the purchasers in
148 MD&A Final Rule Release, supra note 145. For domestic issuers, the
MD&A requirement is contained in Item 303 of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. §
229.303 (2004), and for foreign private issuers, in Item 5 of Form 20-F, supra note
95.
149 See, e.g., In the Matter of Caterpillar Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 30,532,
[1991-1995 Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 73,830, at 63,050, 63,056 (Mar. 31, 1992) (accepting a
settlement offer in a case alleging Caterpillar's failure to disclose information in its
MD&A about the earnings of its wholly owned Brazilian subsidiary, as well as
uncertainties about this subsidiary's earnings); In the Matter of Sony Corporation
and Sumio Sano, Exchange Act Release No. 34-40,305, [1995-1998 Accounting and
Auditing Enforcement Releases Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 74,575,
at 63,816, 63,820 (Aug. 5, 1998) (finding that Sony failed to disclose the extent to
which net losses attributable to a subsidiary were reflected in Sony's reported
financial results, and ordering Sony to cease and desist from committing any
violation and future violation and to engage an independent auditor); see also
MD&A Guidance Release, supra note 145, at 88,891 n.22 (providing an extensive
list of SEC enforcement actions for violations of the SEC's MD&A disclosure
requirements).
150 The Rule 144A safe harbor from registration is heavily relied upon for
offerings of high-yield bonds because offerings of these securities often do not
qualify for the fast track shelf-registration procedure. Form S-3, 17 C.F.R. § 239.13
(2004), and Form F-3, 17 C.F.R § 239.33 (2004), which are used for shelf-
registration of reporting domestic and foreign private issuers, respectively, may
be used if the issuer has a public float of at least $75 million in common stock or if
the issuer is offering non-convertible investment-grade securities. See supra notes
26-27 and accompanying text.
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the primary offering of the bonds are able to resell the securities in
the secondary market, there is no presumption that investors will
hold the bonds to maturity. In order to be able to assess the
potential secondary market value of the bonds, debt investors are
assumed to need the same types of disclosure to make their
investment decisions as are needed by investors in the company's
shares. Third, MD&A is well-established in the United States as an
important disclosure. Since financial information about an issuer is
considered a core disclosure item in the prospectus, regardless of
the type of security that is being offered, disclosure that provides a
narrative explanation of the financial statements is viewed as
highly material to any investor's assessment of an issuer and the
securities that it is offering. Finally, given the risks that issuers face
in the U.S. legal environment, the prospectus disclosure
requirements must provide issuers with sufficient guidance as to
what information would be viewed as material. A very general
requirement to identify significant events or uncertainties, or to
disclose trends that could materially affect the company's
prospects, would essentially leave issuers adrift in a sea of
potential litigation. Therefore, although the MD&A disclosure
requirement is intentionally principles-based to avoid boilerplate
disclosure, 51  the SEC has provided detailed interpretative
guidance in the disclosure requirement itself, as well as in several
interpretative releases, to assist issuers who are concerned about
the adequacy of the disclosures that they are providing to the
public.
In any case, MD&A disclosure has been viewed in the United
151 The principles-based orientation of this disclosure item reflects the SEC's
intent "to allow registrants to discuss their businesses in the manner most
appropriate to individual circumstances and to encourage flexibility" needed by
management for meaningful discussion. Management's Discussion and Analysis
of Financial Condition and Results of Operations, Securities Act Release No. 6349,
23 SEC Docket 962, 963 (Oct. 13, 1981) (not published in the Federal Register). In
several of the interpretative releases that the SEC has published on MD&A, the
SEC has emphasized the importance of not providing boilerplate disclosures.
When it incorporated MD&A into Regulation S-K, the SEC specifically noted that
the problem with a mechanistic approach to MD&A would be that the provision
of information would be too narrowly focused. See Integration of Disclosure
Systems Release, supra note 143, at 63,636 (noting that requiring additional
specificity in the disclosure requirements would decrease the management's
ability to have meaningful discussion). See also MD&A Concept Release, supra
note 140, at 88,623 (explaining that the disclosure rules were kept general because
the SEC thought a more flexible approach would allow more meaningful
disclosures for each unique registrant).
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States as a topic that is best dealt with in the non-financial
statement portion of a SEC filing. In 1987, the SEC issued a release
to solicit public input on two sets of proposals by U.S. accounting
firms recommending that MD&A be audited, among other
things.152  Almost all of the 196 commentators opposed the
proposals put forth by the accounting firms. 53 The SEC never took
any other action on the proposals.
Although there is a voluntary auditing procedure in the United
States, 5 4 it is rarely used. As a practical matter, it is extremely
difficult for an auditor to audit MD&A in the traditional sense of
the word, e.g., to ascertain whether proper accounting treatments
were applied to recently completed transactions and, in some
cases, ongoing transactions. Audits normally involve reviews of
historical financial information. MD&A, in contrast, consists of
"soft information," such as management's analysis about the
company and its prospects, which is not easily subjected to what is
normally viewed as an audit. In any case, auditors are already
expected to review MD&A and other disclosures contained in a
SEC filing for consistency with the financial statements contained
in the filing. 55
152 See MD&A Concept Release, supra note 140, at 88,624-25 (describing the
proposals that were submitted by Coopers & Lybrand and a consortium of seven
accounting firms).
153 See MD&A Interpretive Release, supra note 145, at 62,144 (chronicling how
nearly all of the commentators opposed the proposed MD&A changes, but some
suggested that an interpretive release might improve compliance).
154 PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD, INTERIM ATTESTATION
STANDARDS, § 3, Part 1, Rule 3300T, at 45 (2003) (adopting the AICPA's Auditing
Standards Board's Statements on Standards for Attestation Engagements,
including Statement on Standards for Attestation Engagements No. 10);
CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES, Statement on
Standards of Attestation Engagements No. 10, § 701 (Am. Inst. of Certified Pub.
Accountants 1972).
155 See PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD, supra note 154, § 3,
Part 1, Rule 3300T, at 45 (adopting the "generally accepted auditing standards, as
described in the AICPA Auditing Standards Board's Statement of Auditing
Standards No. 95" in connection with the preparation or issuance of any audit
report by a registered public accounting firm and its associated persons);
AMERICAN INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB. ACCOUNTANTS, AICPA Professional Standards,
Filings Under Federal Securities Statutes, AU § 711 (1981) (describing the
auditor's liability with respect to information contained in registration statements,
proxy statements or periodic reports); AMERICAN INST. OF CERTIFIED PUB.
ACCOUNTANTS, AICPA Professional Standards, Other Information in Documents
Containing Audited Financial Statements, AU § 550 (1975) (providing guidance
for the auditor's consideration of non-financial statement information contained
in annual reports filed pursuant to the Securities Exchange Act).
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5.1.2. EU Approach
In contrast to the U.S. approach to MD&A, which requires such
disclosure regardless of the type of issuer involved or the type of
security that is being offered to the public or listed on an exchange,
the new EU prospectus disclosure framework only requires
MD&A disclosure for public offerings or admissions to trading of
equity securities.15 6  The equity disclosure requirements are
modeled on the IOSCO International Equity Disclosure Standards,
which include a section on MD&A.157 The omission of such a
requirement for public offerings and listings of debt securities,
regardless of whether the debt will be sold to retail or institutional
investors, suggests that this information is viewed as less relevant
to debt holders. Such a conclusion would appear inconsistent with
the Prospectus Directive's stated disclosure objective. Article 5(1)
of the Prospectus Directive indicates that the objective of the
prospectus requirements is to "enable investors to make an
informed assessment of the assets and liabilities, financial position,
profit and losses, and prospects of the issuer and of any guarantor,
and of the rights attaching to such securities." 158 This implies that
the financial information about the issuer is one of the most
material disclosures contained in the prospectus. If that is the case,
then the MD&A should be viewed as essential disclosure because it
puts the financial statements into the appropriate context for
investors.
This puzzling omission in the prospectus disclosure
requirements for debt offerings can perhaps be explained by
several essential differences in the market concerns, disclosure
paradigm, and legal framework of the EU compared to the United
States. First of all, there is little liquidity or price transparency in
the retail corporate bond market in the EU, so retail investors are
expected to hold their bonds to maturity as a practical matter.
Second, the very real competitive concerns the EU faces in
retaining its dominance over the Eurobond market has resulted in
156 See Prospectus Implementing Regulation, supra note 17, Annex I (setting
out, among other things, that the minimum disclosure requirements for the share
registration document require all changes in equity).
157 IOSCO, supra note 136, Part IV., at 14 (addressing "Operating and
Financial Review and Prospects"). See Prospectus Directive, supra note 17, art. 7(3)
(stating that implementing measures would be based on standards set out by
international securities commission organizations and in particularly by IOSCO).
158 Prospectus Directive, supra note 17, art. 5(1).
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very nuanced regulatory consideration of the disclosures required
for broad categories of securities. As a result, because investments
in shares are generally perceived as being at least somewhat risky,
MD&A-type disclosure is required. On the other hand, retail
investors in corporate bonds are assumed to be primarily
interested in the payments of interest and principal on the bonds.
The benefits of requiring MD&A disclosure by corporate bond
issuers are presumably outweighed by the potential costs to both
the issuers and the markets.
Third, the proclivity of EU regulators for principles-based
requirements is reflected in the limited trend and prospects-related
disclosure required in debt prospectuses. Although debt
prospectuses are not required to contain a full-fledged MD&A,
they must include certain disclosures that are required to be
included in the MD&A section of a U.S. debt prospectus. For
example, prospectuses for bond offerings to retail investors in the
EU are required to include either a statement by the issuer that
there have been no material adverse changes to its prospects since
the date of its last published audited financial statements or a
description of the material adverse changes,15 9 as well as disclosure
of "any known trends, uncertainties, demands, commitments, or
events that are reasonably likely to have a material effect on the
issuer's prospects for at least the current financial year." 160 Both of
these disclosure items are actually included as part of the MD&A
requirements in the U.S. framework. 161  The EU prospectus
requirements for offerings of wholesale debt require even less
disclosure in this area. Issuers of such securities are only required
to disclose the issuer's statement that there have been no material
adverse changes in its prospects since the date of its last published
audited financial statements, or a detailed description of the
material adverse changes.162 The more limited information that is
required for wholesale debt offerings undoubtedly reflects the
assumption that institutional investors can conduct the due
diligence necessary before making an investment decision.
159 Prospectus Implementing Regulation, supra note 17, Annex IV, Item 8.1.
160 Id. at Item 8.2.
161 See Item 303(a) of Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.303 (2005); items 5.A.,
5.B. and 5.D. of Form 20-F, id. § 249.220f (requiring a discussion of changes in
financial condition and other information necessary to understanding changes in
financial condition).
162 Prospectus Implementing Regulation, supra note 17, Annex IX, Item 7.1.
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Finally, MD&A appears to be a less established concept in the
EU markets than in the United States, and is viewed by many EU
regulators as more appropriately falling within the domain of
accounting standard-setters rather than securities regulators. This
is evident from some of the recent initiatives to improve the quality
of MD&A disclosure. For example, in the United Kingdom, the
U.K. Accounting Standards Board issued a Reporting Standard on
MD&A in May 2005163 in response to legislation that was adopted
in March 2005. The legislation makes it mandatory for a quoted
company in Great Britain (i.e., a company with shares listed in a
European Economic Area state, on the New York Stock Exchange,
or on Nasdaq)164 to prepare a directors' report that contains MD&A
disclosure for financial years beginning on or after April 1, 2005.165
This will effectively include some corporate debt issuers, as many
of them would qualify as quoted companies. The legislation also
requires auditors to state in their report whether the information
provided in the directors' report is consistent with the relevant
financial statements, 166 which is an approach similar to the U.S.
requirements for auditors' review of non-financial statement
disclosures contained in a SEC filing. Moreover, the IASB recently
appointed a project team of national accounting standard-setters,
led by the New Zealand accounting standard-setting body, to
163 ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, REPORTING STANDARD 1: OPERATING AND
FINANCIAL REVIEW (2005), available at http://www.asb.org.uk/images/uploaded
/documents/Web%20optimized%20FR%20REPORTING%20STANDARD.pdf
(specifying requirements for businesses' operating and financial review ("OFR")).
The importance of MD&A-type disclosure was first noted in the United Kingdom
in 1992 as a result of the report published by the Committee on the Financial
Aspects of Corporate Governance. The U.K. Accounting Standards Board soon
afterwards, in July 1993, issued its initial statement on Operating and Financial
Review which provided guidance that was "persuasive rather than mandatory."
See ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, EXPOSURE DRAFT ON REPORTING STANDARD 1:
OPERATING AND FINANCIAL REVIEW, app. C, at 31, 33 (Nov. 2004) [hereinafter U.K.
OFR EXPOSURE DRAFT], available at http://www.frc.org.uk/images/uploaded
/documents/OFREDweb.pdf (presenting the proposed standard for comments).
164 U.K. OFR EXPOSURE DRAFT, supra note 163, app. A, at 26. This emphasis
on quoted companies reflects the view that such companies have dispersed share
ownership, and that this information will better enable institutional investors to
"engage with management." See id., app. C, at 33.
165 See The Companies Act 1985 (Operating and Financial Review and
Directors' Report etc.) Regulations 2005, 2005, S.I. 2005/1011, § 234AA (U.K.),
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2005/20051011.htm. [hereinafter The Companies
Act 19851 (requiring directors of a quoted company to prepare an operating and
financial review for each financial year).
166 Id. § 235, 10.
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consider whether MD&A should be taken up on the agenda of the
IASB.167 Currently, no international accounting or reporting
standard requires MD&A disclosure.
Because MD&A elucidates the information contained in the
financial statements, there may be a general view in the EU that
accounting standard-setters are the most appropriate bodies to set
disclosure requirements in this area. However, if MD&A is viewed
as part of the financial statements and must be audited, there is a
potential risk that a company's auditors may discourage or try to
limit disclosure of desirable forward-looking information and
analyses by management because of their discomfort with
applying audit assurance mechanisms to "soft" information. In
any case, regardless of who is tasked with developing MD&A
requirements, the Market Abuse Directive indicates that EU
Member States are obligated to ensure that issuers provide price
sensitive information to the public. 168 This presumably means that
financial regulators have the ultimate responsibility for making
sure that the disclosure requirements for crucial disclosure items,
such as MD&A, are adequate.
5.2. Approaches to Related-Party Transactions Disclosure
Related-party transactions disclosure is another issue that
illustrates the regulatory divide between the EU and the United
States. The same influences at play with respect to MD&A
disclosure apply to this disclosure item as well. The EU prospectus
disclosure framework largely delegates authority to the accounting
standard-setters to set disclosure requirements regarding related-
party transactions. Under the EU prospectus disclosure regime,
related-party transactions disclosure is only required for public
offerings and listings of shares. Even in that context, the
prospectus disclosure requirements for that disclosure item refer to
the international accounting standard on related-party
transactions.169 Separate prospectus disclosure requirements for
167 See Press Release, Int'l Accounting Standards Bd., IASB Announces New
Work Programme (June 27, 2002), http://www.iasb.org/docs/press/2002
prlO.pdf (announcing the new technical projects IASB will implement); U.K. OFR
ExPosuRE DRAFT, supra note 163, app. B, at 31 (identifying the national accounting
standard-setters that comprise the IASB project team).
168 See Market Abuse Directive, supra note 16, art. 1(1) (defining insider
information as information that if made public would drastically impact the price
of the financial instrument).
169 See International Accounting Standard 24 Related Party Disclosure (IAS 24)
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related-party transactions only apply if IFRS would not apply to a
company, such as a company whose securities are not admitted to
trading on an EU-regulated market. In that case, transactions that
are material to the issuer should be disclosed, as well as the
amount or percentage of the company's revenue that comprise
related-party transactions. 170  No related-party transactions
disclosure is required for public offerings or listings of debt
securities. Such disclosure would only be required to the extent
that IFRS required the disclosure of these transactions in the
financial statements.
The EU approach to related-party transactions may again
highlight greater participation by retail investors in the equity
markets compared to the debt markets. Under the International
Accounting Standards Regulation, EU companies that are admitted
to trading on an EU-regulated market must prepare their
consolidated financial statements according to IFRS.'71 As a result,
IAS 24, the relevant accounting standard on related-party
transactions under IFRS,172 only applies to financial statements
prepared by listed issuers that prepare consolidated financial
statements. These types of issuers are larger and presumably more
likely to have dispersed share ownership. This standard mandates
more detailed disclosure than the analogous U.S. accounting
standard, most likely because it is the only source of disclosure
requirements in this area. In addition, the reliance on accounting
standard-setters may reflect a historical bias that auditors are better
able to obtain and enforce such disclosures through their audits of
the financial statements.173
In contrast, issuers in the U.S. markets must provide disclosure
of their related-party transactions in their financial statements, as
(Int'l Accounting Standards Comm. Found. 2004) (which has been incorporated
into the IFRS); Commission Regulation 2238/2004, 2004 O.J. (L 394) (EC) No.
1725/2003 Adopting Certain International Accounting Standards in Accordance
With Regulation (EC) No. 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the
Council, as Regards IASs IFRS 1, IASs Nos. 1 to 10, 12 to 17, 19 to 24, 27 to 38, 40
and 41 and SIC Nos. 1 to 7, 11 to 14, 18 to 27, and 30 to 33 (stating that
amendments to the Commission regulations are in accordance with the
International Accounting Standards).
170 Prospectus Implementing Regulation, supra note 17, Annex I, Item 19.
171 See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
172 See supra note 170.
173 See, e.g., Gregory Viscusi, Corporate Flim-Flam Could Hit Europe, TORONTO
STAR, July 4, 2002, at C05, available at LEXIS, News Library (describing the limited
enforcement powers of some regulators).
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well as in the non-financial statement portion of their prospectuses
according to the disclosure requirements set by the SEC. Although
the relevant accounting standard, Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 57 ("FAS 57"), requires financial
statements to include certain disclosures about material related-
party transactions, the requirements are relatively general, 174
especially when compared to the prospectus disclosure
requirements. FAS 57 requires disclosure of the nature of the
relationship involved, a description of the transactions, the dollar
amount of the transactions, and amounts due from or to related
parties for the relevant periods for which the financial statements
are prepared.175 On the other hand, the prospectus disclosure
requirements for related parties are significantly more detailed,
and require disclosure of transactions that would be material to
investors. 176 The assessment of whether a transaction is material
specifically includes an evaluation of the importance of the
transaction to the related-party itself, the relationship of the parties
to each other, as well as the amount involved. 77 This definition of
materiality is more expansive than the one contained in the EU
Prospectus Directive for share issuers, and would require
disclosure of a wider range of transactions, especially where a
large issuer is involved. This is an important distinction, as many
related-party transactions may not be viewed as material to the
issuer, but could be very material to directors or officers of the
issuer who could be tempted to make certain decisions for the
company that would benefit themselves and harm the company.
Several of the recent financial frauds involved abusive related-
party transactions that effectively resulted in the looting of various
companies by insiders, and substantial losses suffered by bond
holders.178 In light of that experience, related-party transactions
174 See FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BOARD, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS No. 57: RELATED PARTY DISCLOSUREs 2 (1982) (specifying
that the disclosures must include: the nature of the relationships involved, a
description of the transactions, the dollar amounts of transactions for each of the
periods, and either the amounts due or the terms and manner of settlement).
175 Id.
176 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.404 (2004) (setting forth the disclosure requirement for
U.S. issuers); Form 20-F, 17 C.F.R. § 249.220f (2005) (setting forth the disclosure
requirements for foreign private issuers).
177 See 17 C.F.R. § 229.404 (explaining paragraph (a) of Item 404, Regulation S-
K).
178 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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disclosure would appear to be as relevant to bond holders as to
equity holders. In the EU, there appears to be greater recent
recognition of the importance of this disclosure, notwithstanding
the differential treatment between debt and equity offerings in the
Prospectus Directive. In October 2004, the European Commission
proposed amending the Accounting Directives to require unlisted
companies to provide more disclosure about related-party
transactions. 179 If adopted, these amendments would effectively
require companies that do not have securities listed on an EU
regulated market to provide at least a minimal level of disclosure
in this area. This proposal implicitly recognizes that even though
disclosure cannot prevent fraudulent acts, the mere requirement to
disclose may help prevent the perpetration of some frauds.1
80
6. CONCLUSION: IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE
Regardless of whether securities regulators take full
responsibility for setting prospectus disclosure requirements, or
delegate some of the responsibility to accounting standard-setters
in specific instances, the real regulatory concern is to ensure that all
investors have access to the material information needed to make
their investment decisions. The requirements that have been
developed on either side of the Atlantic reflect the different market
characteristics, regulatory paradigms, and legal frameworks within
each jurisdiction. The EU has done a remarkable job implementing
the comprehensive legislative framework set forth in the Financial
Services Action Plan. The new challenge will be to implement the
legislation in a way that achieves the FSAP's objectives of market
efficiency, competitiveness, and investor protection.
If the EU Prospectus Directive is successful in eliminating some
of the overlapping costs and burdens issuers currently face in
order to comply with the different prospectus requirements
throughout the EU, the cost of issuing bonds to retail investors will
be reduced. Coupled with the "graying" of the population in the
179 Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the
Council Amending Council Directives 78/660/EEC and 83/349/EEC Concerning the
Annual Accounts of Certain Types of Companies and Consolidated Accounts, at 5, COM
(2004) 725 final (Oct. 27, 2004).
180 See Milton H. Cohen, "Truth in Securities" Revisited, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1340,
1352 (1966) (averring that "many a transaction that could not stand the light of
official or public scrutiny has not occurred (or has been undone) simply because it
would have been exposed to that light.").
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developed markets and the resulting need for investment options
other than equity securities, retail investors will likely become
more significant participants in the corporate bond markets in the
future.
As retail investors become a larger factor in the corporate debt
market, the differentiation in the EU's prospectus disclosure
requirements between debt and equity securities may eventually
become inapt. Changes in the legal landscape in the EU may create
more pressure for detailed and more comprehensive disclosure
requirements for both debt and equity securities. Some form of
class action is being adopted in various EU Member States, which
could increase the likelihood that such a mechanism will
eventually become broadly available throughout the EU. At the
same time that investors on the whole are more able to enforce
their rights, the greater participation of foreign investors may
result in institutional investors from the United States and other
countries exporting their activism to the EU markets. Moreover,
with the greater globalization of the markets generally, increased
foreign investor participation in the EU capital market could result
in the transport to the EU of investor expectations for more
comprehensive disclosures, disclosures that are similar to what
these investors obtain in their home markets.
In any case, as evident from the discussion of the different
regulatory approaches for soliciting MD&A and related-party
disclosures, prospectus disclosure requirements are not static. The
increasing globalization of the securities markets may well result
eventually in more convergence in disclosure requirements and in
regulatory approaches.
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